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and then a detailed exaf:'inatio{l-9f_-_the 1962 proposals by the 
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United States an.cl the Soviet Union. 
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examination of the possihilities, of dealing with eva~i6ns in the 
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/ light of the 1962 proposals and the various di,_l-emmas arising out 
// 
of the need to secure comp 1 iance with the/ provisions of an 
international agreement. 
The central proposition which emerges from the study is 
the supreme difficulty of securing a proportionate response to 
I 
particular evasions~ The major weaknesses implicit in a threat 
of withdrawal are clarified as well as the stumbling blocks in 
the possihility of recourse against individual violators. 
The general conclusion is that the problems of compliance 
and evasion are more thorny than is generally realized and may 
well prove to be too great to surmount. 
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Charles H. Meyers III 
Abstract 
I . 
This thesis deals with two specific problems in the field of 
·--- I arms control and disarmament - the problems of evasion and\ 
.. 
comp 1 i a nee. 
. . 
it pre~enLS a snore n1scor1ca1f analysis of the-=---.. -.. -... -.-"""'---~::-~----~--
. ., .. .., . 
...... -- ....-....... ~ 
-- ---· 
. - __;_ ..._ .... _ .......... --- ... .,.·-
major proposals of the great powers in the period 1946-1960 
and then a detail~d examination of the 1962 proposals by the 
- . -- -····-·· .... ·-- . ........... ~ ...... 
United States ana the Soviet Union. 
The major contribution of the thesis is a detailed 
examination of the possibilities of dealing with evasions in the 
light of the 1962 proposals and the various dilemmas arising out 
of the need to secure compliance with the provisions of an 
international agreement. 
The central proposition which emerges from the study in 
the supreme difficulty of securing a proportionate response to 
particular evasions. The major weaknesses imp 1 ici t in1 a threat 
of withdrawal are clarified as well as the stumbling blocks iB 
the possibility of recourse against individual violators. 
The general conclusion is that the problems of compliance 
' }-
and evasion are more thorny than is generally realized and may 
well prove to be too great to surmount • 
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Great Power concern toward disarmament renewed itself 
) 
almost imrrediately with the dawn of the nostwar era. It 
found expression in the provision written into the United 
Nation's Charter signed on June 26, 1945. Vii th the estab-
lishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, brought about by 
,. 
the "Truman-Attlee-King Declaration't in late January, 1946, 
discussion of disarmament began in earnest. Earnestness in 
this case, should not be taken to denote genuine sincerity. 
The Commission directed states to develop specific proposals 
pertaining to certain ~spects of disarmament, one of v1hich 
proposed was the development of eft'ective safeguards in terms 
of inspection and other means of protect complying states 
against the hazards of violations and evasions. This stemmed 
from the recognition toot in a.n atomic world no substantial 
gain in security could be derived from disarmament unless it 
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included some means of effective enforcement. Thus, ever 
since 1946, beginning with the now famous Baruch Plan, in-
t d d t t.b +'.1 t .._"' "' ,b_, I.l '. ':'! r,. , i At 1 
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. · So--vi6t U11ion h~,,e· engaged in almost continuous discussions of 
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---~ ··tn1s prob.lem~ ... The r~-~~rd has indeed been a discouraging one• 
In fact, probably the most fundamental schism separating the 
two great powers in regard to the whole nature of disarmament 
has been just this divergent attitude to~vard the type and ex-
tent of the international control machinery designed to insure 
the observance of disarmament commitments. An obvious question 
therefore arises. Although granting these divergent attitudes, 
why has it not been possible to reconcile them? Certainly the 
answer is a complex one.· At the risk of oversimplification, I 
would say that it is primarily a question of power. The power 
problem is -: ntensi fied by the confrontation and drama tic clash 
between a large revisionist power propelled by a revolutionary 
ideology and another prodigious power whose task it has become 
to thwart this expansionistic urge by.attempting to maintain 
... ' the status quo, while·.at the same time trying to bring about 
international change based upon national freedom and liberty. 
Disarmament without some international authority to verify 
i.t and to treat violations, wo1-1ld simply .mean the creation of 
. ,..;;) 
.. , 
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$ 
a pov1er vacuum. Such a premise raises the question; namely, 
where would ultim.qte po~1er liA'? 'Pssentially, it is this is-
' 
st1P over which the eighteefi?vear co ntroversv :tlas hP.en fought.-=·=-------i 
---------------
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of enforcerrAnt which remains the cAntral probler.i-of ·the di;_.arm-
ament riddle. The reason is sim~le. Insnection alonP. cannot 
enforcA disarma:r.ient. It is perha.ps unfa1 r to say that both 
\ 
t· .. 
nations, especially the Soviet Union, are completely unwilling 
to agree to inspection and as a conseq~ence have not reached 
' 
so"1'Je Bgreerr.ent. In reality, they have Da id li p-s er1vrice to tl1e 
causB of disarmament due to world-wide pressure Rnd insistence 
that disarrnarnent negotiations continue~ 'fhe result has been 
that disarr.1.ament talks have been used, in some cases highly 
effectively, as a vehicle for cArrying on nolitial warfare. 
At no time has there been any atte~pt _to pro~ose or exnlore 
• serious fashion an eff~ctive control s\·stem • 
,, 
To facilitate a keener insight and to better understand 
the difficultiAs tha.t. beset the Great Powers in reaching con-
crete ngreenTnts in the area of enforcement, I should liv.A to 
reviev, briefly the mqjor a,spects of T)ostwar nAgotiations on 
.. 
disarmair1Ant relating to this issue. Also·, I vvould like to 
· ..... \ 
~' -, .... 
• i 
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:/··· . . .. •.1 
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compare and evaluate the 1962 United States and Soviet draft 
proposals for complete a~d g~n~r~l_disarmament. It is these 
- - - _..4- - - - - •• - - .- .-:- ,;.. .-· - - - - - •• -· -
_____ .,, ___ ... 
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··-·· -being underta1{en-in Geneva. 
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From th1s analysis I shall at-
,1 
• ·, •. ' ,,.. ·• • ... a •• 
at the pre~ent-time 
"-7".--. __ ._._,,.......,.... .• 
-
~-"l. - ' ••• --- ·t~-:~ "':!.'.'. .. -~- -·.,. • • • ... 
·- · ...... and come to some conclusions regarding them. 
~~ 
" The term international "control" should perhaps be 
. clarified. Inspection and enforcement are two essential com-
ponen_ts of the term control. Yet, I feel much confusion has 
resulted from using "control" as a blanket term to cover both. 
Obviously they are not one and the same. For the pur~ose of 
this paper a clear-cut dis tine tion is made between the two. 
When the term "control" is used, it is understood that the 
reference will be to the problem of enforcement. I shall not 
be concerned with the separate problem of inspection. As men-
tioned previously, inspection controls are not capable of 
detering or punishing a violator bent on evading the disarma-
ment agreement, or bringing about compliance once evasion has 
-occurred. Thus, this paper is essentially interested in what 
way, how, and by whom, the use of force will be utilized in a 
disarn~c.-J world to protect national security, and the fruits 
of a disarmament agreement. 
Two brief points ought to be noted before proceeding. It 
'•,,:·•,...-.;'! 
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is important to recognize the continuing impAct of nuclear 
--
v, ea pons ar1d tl1e development of delivery s~rstems. However 
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weapons have and will continue to change our world, forcing 
us to seek new ways of dealing with old problems and pre-
senting new problems traditional methods are incapable of 
solving. They need not be a curse. ~'-ankind need not be a 
prisoner of technology. 
This introduces the second point. Nuclear weapons 
dramatize the problem of power, and the power problem is 
irrevocably linked to the question of complete and general 
disarmament. The enforcement problem of disarmament is, in 
essence, a redirection of the power flow. The unique charac-
teristic of nation states is the "ability to produce intended 
effe c ts 11 through rAlia.nce upon threat and coercion, girded 
I' by military might. Any analysis of the enforcement p~O':jlem 
,. I 
of complete and general disarmament must bear in mind this 
fundamental question of power. To feil to 'do so is to lose 
• 
sight of a basic element of the nation-state system. 
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On June 14, 1946 a dramatic and most revolutionary 
proposal was put forward by Bernard Baruch, representing 
the United Stat8s Government. His opening words were a 
portent of wba t was to come; 
We are here to mak~ a choice between the 
quick and the de-1rl'). ThRt is our business. 
Behind the black portent of the new atomic 
age lies a hope 9 which, seized upon with 
faith, can worlr olir salvatione If v·1e fail, 
then we have damned every man to be the slave 
of Feare Let us not deceive ourselves; we 
must elect World Peace or World Destruction.l 
At a time when the United States held a monopoly on possession 
of the world's most powerful weapon, the Baruch Plan was sug-
gesting that it would be willing to give it up under certain 
', I, • conditions. One of these conditions was the effective world-
wide control of atomic energy. The key to the successful 
completion of this Baruch felt was obvious; 
••• If I read the signa correctly, the peoples 
want a program not composed merely of ~~ous 
thoughts, but of enforceable sanctions. 
Baruch realized that the interna,t:knal ownership and control 
• .. ,. ·\ .. i 
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.j 
' J 
·7 
~ of atomic energy would necessarily entail the surrender of 
a significant measure of so,,e.reignty. b-Y- -the- -Gr-eat- Po\ve-rs.---- - -----·'.------- - ... 
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tionary. The plan proposed the establishment of an Inter-
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.~ 
-· 
. ...... . - ·-- - - -· -- ... _ .. ,.......,... ........ 
·national Atomic Development Authority to which would be 
delegated vast powers. Among them being: ownership of all 
mines and plants producing atomic fuel; the management of 
these; exclusive capacity to carry on research on atomic 
armaments; the licensing of states to- conduct their own 
'"\ 
atomic (peaceful) research, and full and unrestrained auth-
ority to inspect all activities relating to atomic weapons • 
Baruch 1 s oosition in regard to sanctions for violation 
t 
was made expliclty cle~r. To him enforcement was fundamenbal. 
The concept of punishment was, to him, central to the entire 
scheme. This contribution was expressly Baruch's, for the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report, ~pon which the plan was based 
. 
had left this matter untouched. According to Baruch, the 
international control agency would possess the authority 
to determine violations of the disarmament treaty, as well 
as the penalties imposed. This emphasis upon punishment was 
made emphatic; 
••• It would be a deception, to which I am un-
willing to lend myself, were I not to say to you 
and to our peoples, tlmt the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present systemo•• the subject goes straight to the veto power con-tained in the charter of the United Nations so far· 
. as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The 
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lished prior to the relinquishing of the United States atomic 
arsenal. It is interesting to reflect that Baruch's views 
on enforcement incorporated into the 1946 proposal laid the 
foundation, if not the superstructure, upon which rests the 
United States approach to trn subject today. Baruch went 
so far as to delineate various violations {or which nations 
could be chastized; 
~·; 
-~ 
.. . 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb. 
Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb. 
Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority. Willful interference with the activities of the authorityo 
CreBtion or operation of dangerous pro-jects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license franted by the inter-national control body. 
Here, then, was indeed a far reaching proposalo By 
''· the very nature of its provisions for enforcement, it in-
·dicated that what was needed if disarmament was to come 
about, was a revolutionary shift in the traditional means 
of conducting international relations. Perhaps it was the 
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truly dramatic nature of the plan which caused its downfall. 
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e con ro sys __ em would be to pa..y -a severe price 
in regard to basic ideological:, politic.al, and military in-
-
.. 
- - - - -
.. 
- . --- - --
- - - - t 8 re 3 t S • The Russian rejection, when it did come, did not 
-· 
. ..-., ........ 
come as a shock. Robert Oppenheimer, whose own contribution 
to the plan was significant, expressed open doubts; 
••• 1\.ny attempt at that ti(l1e to establish control along these lines (inter-ownership and control) 
would have altered their whole system and so '. .. altered their whole relations with the Western 
world o o o It vvould have meant tl1a t the Russ j_an Goverrunent would give up control over things going on involving their citizens or their territory. It would 5have meant tha·t there could be no Iron Curtain. 
If one were a diehard cynic or pessimi~ he could point out 
that this very statement b:-t Oppenheimer in~ 1946 has a familiar 
ring in 1964. Change the name and the date to fit the pre-
sent, and one mi0 ht sardonically ask; what real progress has 
been made on basic issues dividing the United States and the 
Soviet Union? Perhaps the best answer is a worn-out, but 
meaningful Cliche, " Rome was not built in a day". 
The Soviet rejectiomwere basic. They objected above 
all to the provisions for international control. To begin 
with, viewed from the power calculus Russian acceptance 
" 
" would have placed them in what, for all practical purposes,~ 
-would have amounted to a permanently inferior position 
_. .l'IY 
y .. _ 
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vis -a vis the United States. The Sovie ts interpreted en -
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would be impartial. 
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The Russians also spurned what they felt would be an 
unwarranted intrusion into their national territory, by 
either the inspectien team or enforcement body. The Soviet 
closed society served and continues to serve as ~a tangible 
asset to their defense program. Another cause for rejection 
was the Soviet fear, and it is conceivable to believe it was 
a real one, that the West, in establishing the control system 
first, would establish that• and no more. A final considera-
f 
£:> 
tion while not shedding light 6n' the present, nevertheless 
bears mention. It was, simply, the natural Soviet desire 
to develop and possess atomic capability. Obviously only 
, by pursuing this course, could she effectively hope to chal-
lenge the United States' world position. From a bargaining 
standpoint, without regard to her universal aims, atomic 
weanons were a must • 
.... 
Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan are in a sense en-
lightening. They serve to bring more sharply into focus. 
,-.. _ 
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-the present Soviet position~ and enable one to understand 
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i· to be desired. The Soviets lost sight of the fact that 
modern science and technology had introduced a new factor 
into traditional disarmament negotiations. Prior to World 
'l'Jar II a control s y·s tern was not a vital nece s si t~r. Arn1aments 
had never been able to ~nflict a sudden catastrophic blow. 
Yet the So~iets in Article 2 and Article 3 of their ~roposal 
would only offer this; 
and• ,
\ 
••• The high contracting partie~; declare that 
any violation of Article 2 of the present con-
vention is a most6serious international crime against hwnanity. 
••• The high contracting parties shall with a 
period of six months from the day of··the entry 
into force of the present convention, pass legis-
lation providing severe penalties for viol,tors 
of the statutes of the present convention. 
Unwilling to accept any form of interna-tional control organiza-
tion, the Soviet plan denied a basic scientific fact. The 
safest and perhaps the only way of guarding against a global 
holocaust was first to provide for inspection, then to provide 
for some effective means of dealing with and preventing evasion 
. ,,_. 
\ 
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from multiplying. Characterized by·an absence of international 
control, any plan negotiated in 1946 or 1964 would have a 
. - -
1 nre~i; ive for 9'\. ... aa4011. Obviuasly, however, a na on 
intent upon expansion, and whose past ex nsion had been pre-
. ' ........ , .... .,,,....,_. ,. 
- - --·,_~.:.~_. ... ·-J.__trol syste·m tlie" very ·es·se'n'ce of which sought to inhib.it the 
use of force as an instrument of national policy. The Soviets 
sidesterped the Bar~ch Plan by counter proposing that, as 
just quoted, the control system be established after the des-
truction of atomic weanons stocks. This, naturally, the United 
States was not about to accept. What the Soviets really meant~ 
was that each state WRS· to operate on its· own, serving as its 
• 
own policeman. 
In June, 1947, the Soviet Union submitted their new con-
-trol plan, constituting a more comprehensive alternative to 
the Baruch Plan than the one put forth a year before. Now 
the Soviet Union seemed to relent in its all-out opposition 
to controls. These changes, however, dealt more with form 
than substance. The Soviets offered to establish an inter-
national control commission under the aegis of the Security 
Council. \Vhile carrying out periodic inspec.tions of specified 
I 
ator1ic plants, it also had the a_uthority, if its suspicions 
were aroused, to .make recommendations to the Security Council 
.. 
,,, 
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on meAsures that might be taken to enforce these violations. 
- - - - . - ..: .. -_ ,_ - - - - -
Upon strong grounds, this plan was rejected by __ the __ Unlted_ _ _ ..... , ... ------
---- --- _[ _______________________ _ 
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possibility of sane tions, at least by the United Nations, - . .: . . . ~ . 
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bY the use of tho veto~---In addition,Soviet inSistence 
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inadequate by the West • 
In 1948, the Soviets again off'ered to establish a con-
trol system with a controlling agency having the rir;ht to 
inspect and enforce. However, what assured American rejec-
tion was the qualifying phrase, 11 but not the right to inter-
fere in the domestic affairs of the states". 8 Just such a 
qualification reveals the hollowness of Soviet adherence to 
"strict international control" which they themselves have 
declared to be necessary. 11Strict international control" 
could not be obtained by putting into force any plan based 
on Soviet proposals dating from 1946. Perhaps to the Soviets 
the 1948 proposal was a concession, yet in reality it was 
little more than a grandstand play I'or propaganda_ purposes. 
Although superficially it appeared that the International 
Control Commission had the right to enforce its decrees. 
, 
the case really was that it could only do so by recommendation 
to the Security Council. Obviously these recommendations .. 
. '!f. 
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,, . c6uld not be considered an adequate form of control. Cer-
______ ... _______ __ 
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compulsory nature, and therefore the International Control 
) Com~ission had no mandatory powers. If the Soviet proposals 
. , were carried out, the slightest evasion would have to be re -
ferred to the Security Council, resulting in obvious delays. 
In addition, if accountability for nuclear material began 
to show irregularities, or if measures were taken by a viola-
tor to make verification of production in atomic plants im-
possible, it would still be impossible for the Control Com-
mission to take direct action. Whether their action be an 
order to lessen plant production to bring about increased 
inspection or other measures designed to arrest the apparent 
or real violation. In short, as designed by the Soviet Union, 
the International Control Corrnnission would not be empowered 
to enforce compliance. 
Throughout this period and into the early fifties, the 
two major differences separating the two nations may be 
summed up as follows. Simply stated, the West desired control 
first; an organized and established means whereby evasion 
~-·--.. ---
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~ could be readily detected, and the disarmament treaty en-
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forced. ~o doubt about_ it, the.re was sound logic in this . - - . - . . \ 
mentation or·· control and then no disarmament. The Rq.J!.s.Ja.ns . .. - ' . . -· . ... . .. .. .. ..... - . . . . .. . '' . . . ' ' . . 
- . - .. . . . .. ·-
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were concerned that if the Vl/es·t had its way, Soviet opportuni-
...... ~·- .. ~,,.- .. ,~ .... ' 
......... a~" __ ,., _.. ..... ,.,,,,,. -. ·-~--- ..... ~.-, ... ,.·n-.-· .. · ........ -tI e s·--r~ r evasion to strengthen its position would be hard to 
manage. These apprehensions, whic(h mu,st be accorded some 
credence, led the ·s6viet Union to insist upon the creation 
of a control system last,~ after conventional and nuclear 
disarmament had been achieved. ·The second major difference 
centered around the fact that the Soviet version of enforce-
ment was tantamount to national self-control. Given the 
nature and degre·e of mistrust fanned by ths nature· of the 
conflict separating East and West, it is difficult to con-
ceive of such enforcement working then or even now, almost 
two decades later. Bernard Bechoefer succinctly sums up the 
Soviet attitude to disarmament negotiation during this period 
when he describes their position as being a "you accept our 
9 proposal and we shall then tell you what it means" approach. 
During the period between 1949 and 1952, little progress 
was made in rega~d to control. Discussions served largely for 
restating of the same problems, and the same tiresome phrases 
were used for propaganda purposes. Both nations seemed to be 
I .. ___ ........ 
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marking time. _ This period was highlighted by the Soviet 
walk-out of the Security Co1...1nc il in January 1950, resulting 
- - - -
-----'~~~-~1-:Hnr-tt-arr e-leven-mo'nth-::-suspens16n · Of neg~tia.tions. Recognizing 
·......-. 
-·- ·-·-
.·. "• 
that the Soviet definition of the phrase '~s_t_r_iot. _j_nt.Arrra--.-r-·-· 
------tiona 1 OOntrol H l .did not necessarily mean that 1 t W8S to be _.n..... 
___ v-,........,_.i.·· ...... -.. -....·- ... 
r,adequBte" c·on·t;~i·--;·-the United States submitted, in May, 
1950, a paper in which it outlines its views in regard to 
.... 
"safeguards't. It should be noted that at thts time priniary 
emphasis was being placed on conventional armam.ents. As 
to the objective of safeguards, the paper ·state that their 
purpose was to; 
••• Ensure that nations fulfill their responsi-bilities and obligations as prescribed in the treaty for the regulation and reduction of con-ventional armaments and armed forces, and so to protect complying st-ates against the hazards of violations and evasions.lo 
As to what action may be taken upon the determination of s 
viol~tion, although stating th.at.the international agency , 
responsible for safeguards should refer to the Security 
Council, the paper went .on to state that; 
••• Since the purpose of the system of safeguards is to protect conplying States against the · 0
: hazards of violations, failure by the Security Council to correct violations or otherwise en-force the treaty should relieve participating States from their obligations thereunder and per-mit them such freedom of unilateral or collective action as is con~istent with the Charter of the United Na tiona .ll 
By way of reinforcing this view, President Harry s. Tpuman 
'i ~,,.,.,-........ .;...; •. ~-~ ••. • ••••. 
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. ' .-. ·~ ,- . 1 ' ). ·! ' •. ·-·· •- . 
I •·' 17 
appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations 
• a - - . • •. - - ~~. -~h_e _ .r~ i_i __ of_ l_~P.0_. t_o .. enum.e1~a.te •.three. princ-iple s endemic· .... • • •. • .. -C .•c .•. •. - •• -
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principle he declared; 
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safeguards which will insure the compliance of 
all nationso The safeguards must be adequate 
to give imrriediate vvarnir1g of any threatened 
violationa Disarmament m~~t be policied con-
.tinuously and thoroughly·. 
By 1_952 emphasis was on the prevention rather than just 
regulation of war. There was the general recognition that 
any disarman1ent plan to be effective would have to cover all 
weapons, not just the international control of atomic energy. 
In addition, the United States no longer insisted on the ac-
ceptance of a plan for international control prior to any 
plan for reducing conventional arms. By the same token in 
-
March, 1952, the Soviet Union submitted a paper which pro-
posed that the establishment of controls should come into ef-
fect simultaneously·. In addition, the Soviets for the first 
ti":e supported the idea of "continuous inspection". Yet in 
a show of outright ambiguity and blatant contradiction, she 
at. the sarne time, added, "without the right to interfere in 
13 the domestic affairs of States". However, the first period 
of pomprehensive disarmament proposals was initiated., Now 
more than ever the nee es s i·ty for strong enforcement measures 
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was apparent. From this period was to evolve later the 
\.. . 
United States' emphasis upon a third_ -~<;>~9~,--~n- _!nterna_ti_Qn_al _________________ _ 
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that thore be an international peace force stronger than any 
.. ........-- e.lJ,•·· --.;:,.,........ i..r---...-. ~···'~. ..... . .. . . . ... . . . -
-rll:ftiun.b.1·-st·at'e to- erif-orc·e·~-~suostanti ve violations in a disarmed 
world. In a paper submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Com~ittee 
on May 25, 1954, the United States proposed four specific 
powers that the control organ should possess for dealing with 
violations of the treaty establishing the system for the con-
trol of atomic energy. They were as follows; 
' 
a) calling upon the offending State to remedy 
within a reasonable time the violations or 
other infractions; 
b} Bringing about the suspension of the supply 
of nuclear materials to the offending State; 
c) Closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials 
in the offending State; 
d) Reporting to the Security Council, to General 
Assembly, and to all States the violation or 
other infraction in order to permit appro-
priate actions by the United Nations or by 
individual States in accordance with the in-
ternational convention establishing the con-
trol. organ. 14 
The only way to remedy major violations was the provisions 
indicated in (d) above. Obviously, military action by the 
United Nations could come only from the Security Council. 
There, the Soviet U_nion grimly confronted the other po'l1ers 
with the threat of its veto. In bringing forth these measures, 
the United States was ending its adherence to its position 
.4> • 
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taken in the Baruch Plan, namely, thet all states should 
give up their veto in connection with m~asures to punish 
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D11ion executed vvl1at seemed li1:e a ·- l 
__ c_~~pl~:_e_ turna~o-~t. At first rl~~c~ ·-t~e---~~vlets wen~ far . ·····-. 
to meet Western demands for continuous inspection. States-
man and scholar Philip Noel-Baker, a member of the "if only" 
school of disarmament, called the Soviet res po.nse the "moment 
of hope". The Soviets, it is granted, did make concessions. 
They proposed, for example, that the international control 
D 
organ, .. should have; 
1. A staff ••• selected on an international basis. 
2. The richt "to requisition from states any 
necessary inforw2tion or execution of measures 
for reduction of arn1a:me11ts and armed forces". 
3. Arn1a111ently- in all States signatories to 1 ·,t11e 
convention its own staff of inspectors having 
within the bounds ,of the control function they 
exercise, access at all times to all objects 
of control. 
4. Rights and powers to exercise control, including 
inspection on a continuing basis to the extent 
necessary to ensure implementation of6 the disarn1ament agreerr1ent by all States. 
Howe~er, these concessions were of little weight when held 
in the light of two other considerations. The first is that 
the Soviets stated openly in the long preamble to its pro-
posals what Western statesmen had begun to fear and suspect 
for some tirrie. That, as the Soviets so clearly put it; 
\ 
.. 
·-. 
\. 
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••• There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control. 
'. and for organizing the clandestine manufacture 
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To compound this difficulty, was the fundamental fact that 
the Sovie ts we re significantly vague as to the a,1 thori ty of 
the control organ supervising the disarmament DrograM. Thus, 
at the same time they were indicating their recognition of 
the need for an effective control system, they were arguing 
that the existing distrust between States made a foolproof 
syste~ untenable, and were refusing to discuss, consider, or 
propose the amount of atlthority needed in order. that the 
control com~ission could adequately attempt to enforce com-
pliance. .t\t this. point realization that it was technically 
impossible to detect all hidden nuclear stockpiles, and that 
a treaty abolishing all nuclear weapons could not be guar-
anteed, made it inevitable that any complete and general 
disarmament plan must provide for an organization with suf-
. ficient aJJ,.thority gnd power to enforce the disarmament system. 
In 1959, the emphasis shifted once again to complete and 
general disarmament. On September 13, 1959, Nikita Khrushchev 
appeared before the United Nations General Assembly to submit 
,( 
1, 
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the Soviet Union's declaration on this vital issue. In es-
sence what Khrushchev really proposed were partial measures, 
- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - h - - -.. . :;. 
~ O.Jr~ 
~- . . Christi.an Herter ·vnis later to elaborate upon. Khrushchev, ... ....... ... .,.,, :.. ... ···- ....... - . . '. 
....... '·. -·'l'• •• ............ ••••.• • • ....-.··· -.. ,.....,. .. ,v-,- . • ------·--· ·~-,._-· .• ,.. - .... --- •••• 
••• this R~~roach comnletely eliminates the possi-
bility of sny St~te gaining n1llit0ry 8dvantages of 
any J-cinc1 o Cornnle te arid genera 1 d lsarmam,3nt vvill 
re~ove all the ob~tacles that hav~ arisen during 
the discussion of tl1e questions involved by ~ar-
.tial disarma~ent, 9nd will clear the way fort~~ 
institution of universal Rnd comnlete control. 
In regard to universal control and maintaining the peace in 
a disarmed world, Khrushchev went on to proDose; 
••. The oblieation by States to place, when 
nee es sary poJ.ice (n1ili tia) detachments at the 
disposal of the Securf~Y Council to ensure the 
keeping of the peace. 
Secretary of State Christian Herter, in setting forth the 
general United States' nosition of February 18, before the 
National Press Club in Washin~ton, had this to say in res-
ponse to the Soviet position. The American" 1 purpose was to; 
••• Cut national armed forces and armaments further, 
and to build up international peace-keeping mach-
inery, to the point where aggression will be de- 20 terred by international rather than national force. 
-· 
In further reply to the Soviets, Herter ass ertad th9_t to as-
sure tl1e successful working of the di sarmarient sys tern, a 
second stage must be introduced, having as its objections to; 
I . 
.,...,. --
I 
--' -, '.:.--' 
••• Create universally accepted rules of law, 
which if follo1ned \Vould prevent a,11 nations 
fro1n attacl{lnes other nations Ci> Such rules of 
· 1a\v sl1oul.d 1)8 1)8.c1ced by a r!orJ..d Cou_rt and by 
\ 
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arr:1cd r or ce s p L1nd-a 1:~ sa fc guA.1~de cl and if 8 rifled 
arra11g s1ne11 ts to t 110 point 1nhe 1..,e no s ·in[~ le 11a t ion 
or grbup of natlo11s co\J.lcl effectively oppose this 
~· ~ ____ .. enfor<2,e_r-:eR~ of ...l.nter'nati,)nal law· by j_ntt?rn.ati .. :J11e..-l 
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Here, was the United States taking the position that an I 
/ 
:o 
interne.tional armed force to maintain peace in a disarmed 'Norld 
was a necessity. James P. Warburg, in his lxx>k, Disarmament: 
The Challe:n£;e of The 60 1 s, mal{es the assertion that Herter, 
al though speaking of disarmament under "internationally con-
trolled enforcement power", was not apparently thinking of an 
all-powerful agency endowed with its own individual military 
force. Warburg's feeling is that Herter was merely bringing 
into the open one side of an unresolved conflict between 
President Eisenhower's State Department and the Department of 
22 Defense. Whatever the case, what Herter advocated was cer-
tainly not too far from what he supposedly did not propose. 
Certainly this position or statement by a high-ranking govern-
' ment official did shed light upon and foreshadow what was later 
to be the actual American position. 
In late September, 1960, the Soviets submitted to the 
United Nations General Assembly the general outline of a 
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treaty on general and complete disarmament to be achieved 
within four years. In this proposal it ignored the Western 
23 
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the r2organiz~tion of the United Nations Secretariat. This 
-- - ..... - .. - - . . ~ -· - - -
coincTifed wi th-IHkf ta··-Khr;u~ hche VI s at tack on the Secretary-
General in a blatant but futile attempt to secure his removal. 
The direct result of this maneuver was an attem~t to link the 
.L. 
-·· 
question of the Secretary-Generalship with that of disarmament 
and the creation of a UnitBd Nations international armed force. 
Khrushchev in outlining his gSneral disarmament treaty had pro-
poSed a triumvirate, consisting of the three major blocs; the 
Communist, the "capitalist", and the neutralist, to head the 
control council carrying out enforcement. Action would neces-
sarily require unanimity. James Viladslf1orth, United States disarm-
ament representative makes clear the true effects of such a 
proposal; 
••• I,11embers will readily recognize that such · 
steps would critically impair the ability of 
the United Nations to prevent·or deter aggres-
sion either in an armed world, a partially di5-
A.rmed world, or a completely disarmes world. 
; 
The Western proposal submitted on June,27th, and entitled, 
,. 
n Pro0 ram For General and Comple!;.e--<bisarmament Under Effective 
,/· 
/ 
_,.?"// 
/ 
International Control", ha/made specific provisions beginning+_,. 
in stage two for; 
·- - . -
- - . . - . -
0 
••• An international peace force, with the United Nations, shall be !)rogressively establisl1ed and 
malnta .i11ed \V~i..tr1 agreed porsonnel s tre11e;tr~ a11d 
.... --- -arma1ne11ts sufficient to pr1ese1)ve \'Jorld pence 24 
·, 24 
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. . -_ ~-- _. __ B~y t r1 is t 'i ·ie, i c vv~. s ,_rec o_g;n:, :z er~ that - t·f&. c rJ1c ia 1- ·:iu est ion-· 
would concern the nati1r9 of the/enforcen1e11t. The problem per-
sists to the present day. In essen6e, the nroblern has come 
down to; will ,the Soviets accept inspection and enforcement, \ 
i.e., control over disarmament, by a world organization it 
does not dominate? It is nossible that before the problem of 
enforcement is solved, disaFnament may begin. Hovvever, it can 
proceed only so far, and in terms of truly significant measures 
not VAry far at all··, before the problem of a viable enforce-
ment system must be worked out to the world's satisfaction. 
What complicates the problem, is that what is primarily being 
dealt with is a world-wide power shift from sovereign nations 
to a neutral body acting impartially in the interests of all. 
This sl1ift is further complicated by the ·inescapable fact that 
, 
.._... . . ... .. - """ . -. - . . ---;. 
ri;_\ its implications extend into the political, social, and economic 
realm, affecting each nation differently according to its own 
., 
particular traditions, customs, and desires. Traditionally, 
.,· 
military might, whether used openly or as a latent threat, 
has been the major lever whereby each state has sought to aa--
vance itself in the -world hierarchy. An excellent example/ is 
I 
,., , // 
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the building of a. "force de frappe" by France. It need 
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to her in power, in such ways as to work her will. 
, 
By 1961 specifically, as of September 20~ 1961, the 
·- ·-- ..... ...._. __ -· .... -~. ,., ........ -- ·" .,., ...... , ... ···~ 
United States and the Soviet-Ori.ion had reached a joint agree-
ment on principles governing complete and general disarmament 
negotiations in the future. The joint statement called for; 
Also; 
••• The establishment of reliable nrocedures for 
the oeaceful settlement of dis~utes and effective 
arrangements for the maintenance of peace in ac-
cordance \Vith tr1e principles of tl1e United J:T,~tj_ons 
Charter ••. and that States shall supnort and provi~~ 
agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. 
••• All disarmament measures should be implemented 
from beginning to end under sti§~ strict and ef-
fective international control. 
~he draft statement goes on to state further that; 
1 
••• The necessary measures to maintain internation-
al peace and security, including the obligation of 
States to place at the disposal of the United 
. Nations agreed manpower necessary for an inter-
natio11al peace forceo oeArran.gements for the use 
of this force should ensure that the United Nations 
can effectively deter or surpress any threat or use 
of arms in violation of the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. 7 
Although here is a broad general agreement, indicating some 
progress, there are still many obstacles to agreement in the 
area of enforcement • While differences prevailed in 1961 as 
r. 
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to how and what should be inspected, there were concrete dif-
ferences as to what_consituted rella.ble proced.t1res- for.e.n---- ----· __ ·.:..:·---·--
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how much authority and power the United Nations Control 
Agency must have. 
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The United States made an auspicious start in terms of 
the Baruch Plan, and has seemingly been willing to recognize 
the need for a world force administered by some authority sue~ 
~s the United Nations to maintain peace in a disarmed world. 
However, it is by no means certain that the United States 
would readily agree to a disarmament agreement even if the 
Soviets were to meet our demands in regard to enforce~ent. 
This is not to suggest that the United States' position is an 
insinc§re one, or even necessarily hypocritical. It is my be-
li9f that part of our hesitancy to agree would be based upon 
the fact that at the present time the United States has not 
e clear-cut conception of just what a d isarn1ed world would 
look like, or how it might be thought to function. The United 
States, however totally dedicated to complete and general dis- . 
armame~t, is not about to embrace the condition as a come-
what-may, for better or worse proposition. Until we have had 
a ch.ance to think and rethink our position and role in a dis-
armed world, no progress will be maa·e towards getting complete 
27 
and general-a isarmament out of its "propaganda only" rut. 
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may a~ c.eler~g te our tr1ir11'~ing and decis-ic,ns. One tl'1i11 ·; i g ce r-
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I 
· tain; neither technology nor smaller nations will remain quies-
cent, lying nascent until we2_!1d the_~ov!!~s get_around to con-
._..... -
sidering wra t is a workRble alternative to nuclear weapons as 
an instrument of foreign policy. 
The dilerrrma confronting the ·two great powers is not the 
perpetual dilemma all ages see~ to live with. In acient ti~es, 
it was nBan the sling". Time passed and the same cry became 
"Ban the Bow". And so on, until after the war to end all 
wars, the battle cry of the disarmers became "Ban the Sub". 
Warner A. Schilling, in an enliGhtening paper entitled, 
"Lessons From the Past", discusses a memorandum written by 
the American group of the London Planning Section. In November, 
1918, in preparation for the discussion of Wilson's Fourteen 
Points, the Section concluded that; 
••• The moral and nnterial interests of humanity 
could be served only by the oµtright abolitio~8 of the ·submarine as an instrument of warfare. 
Such a feat was felt to be vi1ithin the realm of achievement, 
for it was believed that the interests of the Great Powers 
coincided with those of humanity. These very words and the 
futility of the noble aim, strike a familiar note today. The 
, . 
fact that through human error; emotional, mechanical, even 
. 
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national, much of our world can be devastated and rendered 
uninhqbitnble, and the fact that as years go byJ there re-
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the pos3ibllity· that a catastrophe may occur,· 
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----- --------- ----
------·---·-·------tas1;-fc-dilemYl18;- Certainl-y one can grasp the difference be-
, 
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urgenc.7 of the Soviet and American fear of a nuclear con-
frontation. The dilemrr.a ls more than an upgraded traditional 
one. A dramatic new catalyst has been introduced into an ir-
reversible equation. Two alternatives face the postwar world. 
Leave the control of nuclear power in the hands of whatever 
nations co~e to possess it, or impose an effective system of 
'"'\ 
• international control over it. 
Since 1946, the positions of both the Soviet Union and 
the United States have evolved slowly, in fact they have on 
·occasion retrogressed. In 1962, both nations managed to 
draw up and submit to the United Nations separate draft 
treaties of complete and general disarmament, using the mu-
tually agreed upon pr5nciples tabled in 1961 as a guide; In 
1964, both nations seem to he cautiously workin[ towards some 
, 
form of detente as nerhans a first step in the long journey 
to disarmament. And because the present disarmament negotia-
tions in Geneva are using tl1ese treaties as"a basis for fresh 
\ 
......... :·-
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exploration of avenues of approach and new pronosals, it is 
.. . 
the 1962 draft tre~tles. 
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The implications of comprehensive disarmament ~.re far 
reaching, if not staggering, when one begins to understand 
the changes a disarmament treaty would bring about. Though 
' 
the Soviet Union has refused to acquiese in the view that 
such an a 6 reement could create a prodigious vacuum in the 
existing international system, it is a view which certainly 
has breat validity,~ Naturally, this in turn poses questions 
as to the structure of a disarmed world, assuming always, 
that so:ne form of structure is necessary. There is merit 
then in tur11irg to the proposed draft treaties of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States tabled in 1962. From 
them come portraits in miniature of the structure of a dis-
armed world, how each, in effect, intends to solve the nrob-. 
lem of power in a disarmed world. 
.~ .. --_ ............ ._._. ·~------·- --
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I On a superficial level, there is general agreement. 
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poses the establishment of an International Disarr1alnent Or- 1 
. 
- . -ganizat~9n to supervise th~ disarmament process, operating 
St ~·····'. 
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..... ~ ............................................ . 
---
_____ ,,,_, 
throu8h the United Nations. In addition, both advocate the 
C general strengthening of the UnitAd Nations and the estab-
lishrrent of a United Nations Peace Force. The differences,_ 
however, are substantial. Far ranging, they hinge on the 
question of balancing relative risks. Stated simply, the 
United States envisages a broad and independent international 
autriori ty to enforce/,,.disarmament and. reduce the risk of sur-
reptitious evasion. The Soviet Union on the other hand pro~ 
., 
poses various political safeguards designed merely to reduce 
intervention in the intArnal affairs of individual nations. 
This divergence is based, I believe, upon different images 
.... 
of a disarn1ed world. The Soviets have continually asserted 
that the very act of disarmament.will bring peace and that 
it is sufficient to maintain national con·tingents available 
to the United Nations, but subject to veto in the Security 
Council. The basis of the Soviet position seems to be the be-
lief that in a world in which armed force is ruled out, in-
tense conflicts can be curtailed without using military force. 
In effect the Soviets propose no forces that would in any way 
• 
I_ 
• .-,C..CC~.--. -- ,.usu• ---~ ·---··-c.,-. - •.. · 
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effectively constitute a challenge t~ nation-states of great 
' 
'"' - ....... _ _...,..._ 
por,e r s- ts tus • ' "' ................. ,...,.,........ .. "' .. . The s~nd-by unit J)ronosed by the Soviets 
1---------=-=~~~=-::-:--::-:-----
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addition, by the end of the third and final stage they would 
·~ 
not have acquired any greater strength. Thus, in the Sovl<L"L 
I' ' , I • - .. .,. . .-r . , , , " '. , 
viev;, the mechanism for enforcement would be the same hoth 
during the disarming proce"ss and ,.~fter disarn1a_rnent has been 
completed. As mentioned, to mobilize these units into action 
would require unanimity. The veto, therefore, would become 
a permanent part of the disarmed world, as implicated in the 
Soviet draft treaty; 
•• .All questions related to the assurance of 
international peace and security, which may 
arise in th3 course of the implementation of 
the treaty, including preventive and er:ifofce-
ment 111easures, shall be decided on by the 
Security Council in conformity wi~b its powers 
under the United Nations charter. v 
In regard to the political control of the Peace Force, the 
Soviets would place the command of the force under three rep-
. resentatives, one each from the three pmver groups existing 
in the world. Action would require unanimity. The Soviet 
draft states that; 
• . 
••• A control council composed of· representa-
tives of the socialist countries, the countries 
participatlng in the Western military alliance, 
and of non-aligned countries ~8 serve as the 
permanent organ of the IDO.o.~ 
In addition, in the Soviet view, the International Control 
\ 
...... 
. _._.,, ... _..... ... _...... .. 
....... ,,,\..._.... ......... _~_ .... 
,. 
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Council, whil~ supervising the application of the disarmament 
---- ... ·- ...... . ·-~ ..... , .,,_'-"' ..... -..... _.,,.,,,_.... ----·-~-
treatyr would possess only a verifying function; 
L ----------__a...~~~..w.........,........,........,~......i..,a,..;--.-;1--·v_; ___ ,--t°':(; th !l +: -f~ ti ':, Il)() \l\T 11 11 
..__ .. ,, "--' 
( 
/ 
not and cannot be entr,us ted v:i th Dr1v fu11ctior1S 
C 
invo 1 v lng the execution of preventive ox: 1 en-forcement n1easures in regard to states 11) ..... 1 
very possibility of detection by the control organ is itself 
a strong deterrent to evasion. According to the Soviet draft; 
••• Any atternpt by an~r party to evade cornpliance 
V'lith the disarman1ent obJ.igations it has assumed 
in order to secure military advantages for it-
self will be exposed by the control organso This 
very fact would have a sobering effect on an!~ne 
who might contemplAte infringing the rreaty. 
The Soviet draft goes on to state; 
••• If in the course of implementation of general 
and complete disarmament, ~ny state or groups of 
states were to take aggressive action, the powers 
of the Security under the Charter of the United 
Nations woul~3be quite a~equate to put an end to such action. 
It is important to note that what the Soviets really insist 
upon is on a strict interpretation of and adherence to the 
United Nations Charter. At first glance one would think that 
the Soviet·'Union, having undergone a catharsis, has aligned 
its ai11s with those of the United Nations. However a.,ppear-
ances do not establish veracity. Technically the Soviets are 
in keeping wlth what was envisaged by the original framers of 
the charter. One finds it difficult to conceive of the Soviets· 
---------;------------------------------·· I 
.. 
-·--
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openly con forming to the charter unless· 1 t served their 
... -.. -· ·-·-····loo . . ..... . _.,.... __ .. ··-
best ihtere-s ts.--- ·····u6vio·u's·iy,-- -their b'es'l~ 'in-tere'"; ts are usually 
not ours. ln point of fact, the Charter, in regard to the 
/'w 
make-up of peace forces, does work against the United States.· 
However, it would only continue to do so if it is regarded 
.... --
...,.,~-.. ,... ... _ - . 
. --
..... w, ................... . 
as an absolute, above change. The manner.in which many 
• .. 
Americans regard the Cons ti tut ion is an excellent analogy,, 
Yet, the Charter should certainly be open to change for the 
simple reason that its framers could not have foreseen the 
exigencies of the present. In politics there can be no ab-
solutes. 
This, in turn, lead to the question of what exactly then 
does the United States propose? The United States proposals 
conjure up a world in which the resort to armed force on all 
levels is ruled out as a means of pursuing national interests. 
Thus, the only way to effectively deal with conflict would 
be throuch international institutions. Punishment by the 
world institution would be a major sanction in terms of dis-
arrnan:ent enforcement. No restraints are suggested on peace 
enforce~ent by the General Assembly or Secretary General. To 
insure that the international authority would be able to pre-
vent the illegal use of force, the United States' draft calls 
for the progressive strengthening of the United Nations Peace 
Force. As stated in the draft treaty; 
, . 
~,.......~_ ··-······· ... ··-
. .I 
.,l, 
••• The parties to the Treaty would progressively 
strensthen the United Nations Peace Force estab-
lished in Stage II until it had sufficient armed 
for~ ce s and a I 1n1arr1e.n ts so t b~_t._ no --s t;a te c ·o u1.a- e hf' ... 1-34 -
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· - - - - - ~-- - - -1'e~'-'"1Ving- ca iJnited ·stat·es , .. proposal~, the Interna tional1 
Disarnament Organization would be ir1vesttm·with both veri-
United States' proposal, the IDO would have a more strongly 
centralized character. Besides the Control Council, there 
would exist a single administrator whose function it would 
be to guarantee effective and impartial implementation of 
IDO func ti ons • ,I 
This points up the fact that the make-up of the inter-
national force is inseparably linked to the organizational 
framework of a disarmed world. The most important difference 
between the Soviet Union and the United States is not in the 
structure of the IDO but ratmr in the proposed relationship 
between the IDO and the United Nations. I find it rather 
diffic,1lt to agree with Bernard T. Feld who, while admitting 
that much of the content of both proposals may be repetitions 
of "old formulas", nevertheless attempts to stress, however 
larnely, that both nations have re-analyzed their previous 
35 positions, and given considerable thought to past deficiencies. 
With the proposals of both nations regardtng the role of 
the IDO ·1n the area of enforcement, and the size of the inter-
, 
national force at its command, as outlined in 1962 drafts, 
1.-
_11!1· ,,·, ','~ ... ·••·• ;;,, .-,---•..-I·,~ ... ·• 
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\.. 
serving as a bac~..ground, I would like to discuss the problems· 
- -
--- --- - · - - -----and -impl-i ca ·t lon·s -of -tl1e· · u n"i t ed states po s 1 ti on. Ever since 
~--__;--------------------~---------------~~~-~~~--·-
.... 
I" 
the __ ~_t~~e_Y0~!1t ___ o_f the ~he_n S~cr_eta_ry .. of StRte Christian Herter 
. __ .., ............ -..... 
. . 
~in lSE-0,- -tFt9-~COn£ept of an-""i1'1t(1t·national force 1tvitr1 supr~~ -_-_ ~rr- - - - - - - - -- -
na ti 012.~ 1 au tho r1-_!x __ has bee ome inc re q sing li.emh~d r, ea -t "!l-,VV,e_.s.J-..er.11 ......... -
disarmament policy. The first point I should like to raise 
is that I am not myself convinced that the United States is 
or would be fully prepared- to accept the consequences and 1~-
plications of the position it has assumed with regard to this 
matter. The logical outcome of ·the United States position is, 
in fact, a world government. 
Now it is not my intent to try and nrove that such an 
end result ~s unattainable or deleterious. On the contrary, 
in the very long run it is probably a most propitious answer. 
However, I would like to show that it is a too radical and 
unrealistic immediate so~tion to the enforcement problem of 
disarmament. Viewed in terms of evolution, I maintain that 
' disarmaMent and world government are not synonomous. Between 
the two is an intermediate stage. It is certainly possible 
to visualize an all-powerful impartial international peace 
force under the direction of the United Nations working ef-
fectively at some ti~e in the f~ture. To propose such an 
organizational framework to come into being upon the duration 
37 
of the thlr·a · and final stage of disarmament is to make too 
. ___ . _. _. _. _ .. a.b_.'3 olu te the .. r.e q.uir-eme n-ts --of a d 1 sa 1-imed world, ir1 terms of 
wn.a-c; is accepJ~ao e in a \Vorld of thriving sovereign entities. 
-~- - ·--
- - - ·- .- - - - - - .. - . . 
Perhaps a simple ~!}aiogy will illustrate rrr:r _premtse. Ideas 
. . . - - - . -
.. ,,_ ----
. .__ ----... 
_.. -·-- •.. ~ --· _--:.- --- ...... -· -~ ~ -·.-
..... 
.. 
do not spring as if by inspiration to the creative mind. 
............ . . ............. _ .. ..,----,.... ........ _ _.... .. ~-- ... IIU~-•.,-..,,.....,_ ,, .. . . _ ...................... - -- -· - - . .._ ... , ..,,. .. 
There ia a fundamental stage between planting of the seed 
and,the blossoming of the flower. The flower is the product 
' 
of the growth of the stem. The idea is the flower. Hard 
----..... ~---·-
work in gathering materials, actual practice, participation, 
involvement is the stem. The point is clear. An all-powerful, 
impartial international peace force administered by an inde-
pendent body is the consummation, the flowering, the end pro-
duct or idea. Yet before this can ever be realized it must 
grow, evolving over a period of time, through actual practice 
and experience. Disarmament will be a radical solution. Con-
sidering the role of force through the centuries, there is no 
need to create as a precondition even more radical rearrange-
ments of the world power structure than is necessary. I find 
it difficult to imagine the complete willingness of the United 
States to settle back, delegating the maintenance of its ulti-
mate security to a force over which it theoretically would 
have not controlled. It may well be that when disarmament 
comes about, it will be founded upon complete and thorough 
' - ~ < -· - C ._ 
,.·--· ,• .. ; ..... ·-... ,. ,, -~~ ' ·~·. 
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inspection and verification, but not, at least initially, 
· · · · · -·· · , .. · · · · · ·upoti t-he· ·c"C>mp·te te · ·s·ub·ord lne .. tion of na tio11al · to· ·international 
·--------· .. 
. 
.... ·-· ·-------------------------------:1 
a u tho r i t 7;r in re g a rd to force • 'N ria t the prob 1 e n1 r ea 11 y_ . ~ q t). ~ _______ . ____ . ___ .. 
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. down . to ts th.is : to go as far 
~_. ........... _ ......... .-- ... ··-· 
as its proposals indicate, which means, for all practical pur-
'· 
poses, world government? Two reasons why we might are in-
·-· dicated by Lincoln Bloomfield. Firstly, disarmament and arms 
control; 
••• Grow out of the vie~ particularly character-
istic of American thinking that international 
relations and arms control are in their essence 
orgar1izational problen1ss, matters to be regulated, 
and id e:1lly, controlled by appropriP..te orgar,.iza-
tional structureso Secondly, pervasiye historic 
suspicior(s of so~viet motives h8.s focused 'lJestern 
arm control proposals on organizational frame-
works, which would min1mi~e the possibility that 
the Eastern Bloc countries could cheat.56 
~ .. ---
I·f the United States is not particularly eager to go as far 
a_s world government, then the question arises of whether one 
can conceive of a comprehensive disarmament program based upon 
a set of minimum common interests, complete with an adequate 
inspection and verification organization, but with no really 
drastic shifts in the present concept of national sovereignty? 
If this is possible to visualize, a further question arises. 
~amely, exactly what institution must be created to effect-
,· 
ively enforce disarrnament, having adequate power, yet not so 
\ 
- - - - - - - ... - ·- . ··- . 
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overwhelming that it would intrude too heavily upon spheres 
of action rAservcd by national goiernments-as within their 
- ., . ,... 
HJ }J0 v O l 1 fv O ; , . 
---· ............. ---------····- .. ·-··· 
_____ .................. ----------- .. ------------···-------------
- ________ ....................... -----------
... - - - ....... ....... -------·-
------------------------·- Be fore tackling this question, and in the hope the.t 1 t . _ --·-· ., .. - ----
- 0 
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,• 
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. 
will f·urther dran1a tize the problem at hand, I should like to ,, 
mention briefly the tlFee main theoretical approaches through 
which power may be managed,.whiln indicating qualities of 
each relevant to the discussion at hand. Briefly stated, 
the three aref world government, collective security, and 
/ balance of power. To begin with, the assumption which under-
lies much of the current writing, and also directly implied 
in the United States draft proposal, is that monopoly of force 
is the key to the effectiveness of the enforcement agency as 
an order-keeping institution. Although the agency may be the 
sol~ possessor of_ the power to enforce, implying as this does 
the right to coerce nations if deemed necessary, it still does 
not mean that it will be able to handle an .. .,r conflict which < 
might occur. It is my feeling that the argument of concen-
tration of coercive carability in an authorized organization 
is the solution to the problem of disorder is open to serious 
question. In regard to this, Inis Claud8 has this to say; 
••• To· say that the management of power in inter-national relations cannot be achieved ex_cept by concentrating on effective monopoly of power in a ce11tra·l o.genc;/o ',) QO\ierstates lJoth the requirements and the possibility of the centralization of coercive capacity in a global society.37 
.· :·t_ 
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In regard to the balance of power Claude states; 
. .- -· - ..:. - :-, .:: ·-:· ·-· _, .:. ~ - -· - - - - - - -
- . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -
--------------------- - - -- o.-.'The t,ala:1ce of po1ver may riP[lElCt the need 
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Certainly, one cori tribution of both thA balance of powAr 
:• ,,, • .. • • .. • . . >-· .... . • 
and collective security as concepts· are that they focus 
firmly upon the realities of the multi-9tate system. Though 
it is apparent that in themselves they do not provide an 
.. sdequate 9olution, they at least present a frank confronta-
~ 
tion of the real problem. A further contribution of the 
balance of power as pointed by Claude, is that it; 
'• •• Helps to counter the s tmYJlist ic notion 
that natior;al f~overnment operates as .a mere' 
mechanism of legal com'Tland and enforce.!"lent, 
and the inference th.at globa~ order rright be 
maintained by such a device.' 9 
J 
Further, the balance of power quite obviously ind lea tes that 
~uch of the governing of international society is a matter of 
mutual restraint, exercised by units of society upon each other, 
40 
rather than imposed from above. It is quite apparent that 
the ldea of world government neglects this notion of r~gula-
tlo!'I from within. In addition, if:; is my own feeling that 
world government theorists or advocates seek to deal with the 
reality of the world situation by redefining it, attempting 
to shy away, to avoid dealing with the state. On the other 
hand, as Claude points out, world goverpment does possess the 
• - i, ') 
., 
J' ~,l 
•••• ~.,-, 
.. '_, . -- ... ' ' . .. . - ·- .. , .. - -. - .. 
.;.., •·'·~ 
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virtue of recognizing the nece.ssity for ~ome ~regree of cen-
41 tra 1 i z eel manB.ge111ent 9 r t11 terna_ti_ona 1. r.e.J.~ tj.nns-o --.Pe rhape- - this- - - ----------- -- -- - - . . . . . . .• - - - ·-. ·: ·•. .... . . - -- . -
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···--·········· ---·. ---··the ... e·s·sen:tial inco::1p0tability of unrestrained natJ.onal freedom 
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• - •.• • _. •. • ' • • • • •' I - ' 
~·~----· ·· · ·ar1d t·rre~·'c.fe··trire· for· a ·re·liable··-s·ystem of ·worl.ci° ordei,·.-- This is 
,.... .... --- .. - - -
. • • ... •.- ._ ... ~. • I. "'-• ·' 
__ .,.. ·---·· -----.- ......... ~ .•••• ,,, . ~ • ~.. • •t ..,._ •. ,.,.. '. ·-· • • • • ' 
-· '· 
•. .................. • 1 ......,...,..,,, ....... ~\"'- • • I• • '" • • 
··r'et'ie''c"t"ed dramatically in the tottering, snail-lil{e grov,th of 
• 
international law. Nations desire .it, in fact grope toward 
it, while at thA same time attempt to cling to national sovereig1.ty. 
\' 
Claude sees the great merit of collective security to be 
its emphasis upon the indivisibility of peace and upon the rec-
ognition that the affairs of nations have become, and are cer-
tainly becoming ever ~ore tightly interwoven. As Claude ex-
plicity states; 
••• rhe doctrine of collective security pro-
claims thA growing community of destiny in 
which states are inexorably involved, and de-
mands the conclus1on that states ~ust assume 
coTnr'!on responsibility for safeguardi11g their 
cormnon interest ir1- the stabilization of the international order. 42 
The important point implied in this prsent brief review is 
• that it seems more practical, logical, and sensible to construct 
a world order upon the possibility that states can be induced 
to accept restraint and responsibility in the head-long pursuit 
,) 
of their own interests rather than upon the expectation that 
states can somehow be 2resse1 to abdicate their roles in world 
affairs. This latter would seem to be the. position the United 
, .-- :-··to._;: I ! 
'.,.).•.c, ___ c·-~-•'--.;~ 7 L,_ •. .,., ••• -'' -·•--,· 
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States has assumed, judging from its 1962 draft proposal. 
It is my fee 1 ing _ ~-ffi. ~- _ t_l1~-~ _ !-}_:qt t_e_q _ ~ t~-t~ s _,_._!)Os i ti on., i111plying 
- - - - - - - - - .- -~· ~. -... -:; - -, - . - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - ~ 
. - . . . .. - .. - - - - .. - - - . . ~ . . .. . . - . - - - . . - . - - - .. . - - - - - . -· - . - -- - -- . - r , -- -
-- - - _____ , ,,,__ Which th.8 Unft8a States may in the long run rea'lly want. -- - ... - • - - • .. ''• t. - .... - • .. • • • ' 
/l It 
,. _.,............._. ··-· -
is my belief that the Dnlted States, confronted with a nee~ 
_,_ 
ess I tY Of choice, has !I opted" for a position which may Simply 
....._. ...... 
-- -
not be in its true self-interest. Thus, it is my conclusion 
that the most oprortune answer is not the reorganization of 
the United Nations such that it may be able to develop a 
military establishment which would enable it to exercise co-
ercive control over all or any state. It would seem that a 
more workable system would be one that combines the essential 
virtues of these three different approaches to maintaining 
world order. 
From this brief review, 1 t is obvious th.at the problem 
of enforcement and administration in a disarmed world is in-
ti~ats.ly related. It is at this point that I should 111-ce to 
return to the question posed earlier. What must be created, 
or how must the present system be altered, such that while 
disarmament may be ad0quately enforced, the administrative 
authority not be so overwhelming in its power that it could 
prevent any state from challenging 1 t? 'Nal teri M:illis and 
,James Real, in their t~ubhtful book, T~ Abolition of War, 
offer this opinion; 
••• To keep nroblems within limits, it already 
' ,">- _.,....,... 
... ·' - -
. --
........ 
...... :i;r,;.···· 
' 
seems necessary for the demilitarized world 1, 
to dev .. elop nt lonst a mini1nal forn1 of super-
na t i o rir~ l a t 1 t 11. or i t y o • o In ,j e s ii. n in g a d e 1n i 11-
ta r i z e tJ v.ror·ld 9 tl1e quo;stio11 is vvha t is the 
verv minimu1n of sunAPnnt:ion!:)l !111+:h"y,;_ i-..,+-
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___ .J_Li~43 ___ tl11:1 b.slie-f. cf -b-vth- .. th·e:se-·· n1er1 ·tr1at- this ···-"mir1irnum" can 
,P tv 
be put at a very modest level. 
..... ....-- -
t 
Lincoln Bl.oQmf .. t~d. .... tu. _an in-
._.~ ...... ..,J ....... 
teresting paper states an opinion that would seem to rein-
force this view; 
••• There exists now, given the indispensiable 
quality of the \\'ill, embryonic legislative, 
judlcial, and a someti~es influential frame-
work of world opinion and ad hoc political 
pressure which can carry as much weig~i as 
principal nations arA ready to allow. ' 
Millis and Real go on to state, speaking of the disarmament 
authority, that; 
••• That it would have to establish compulsori en-
forceable jurisdiction in the settleme~t of 'disputesn 
between the great powers seems doubtful ••• the 
superna tional authority will have a modicum of 
4 arrr.ed force und8r its ov1n veto-free command... 5 
The authors go on to state emphatically that; 
••• It would not need and coul~ not havA a great 
suprenational nuclear military force capable of 
coercing any of t.oo great states --upon whose· 
assent its own existence and effectiveness 
would deoAna.46 
This last point is an important one to bear in mind and one 
which is stressed by Inis Clause; l 
••• The international-ar~ed force which is so 
. 
often postulated as the instrument of global 
a11thor)ity 1~ests upon tl1in air unless it is 
grounded in dependence upon the very states 
over which44t is sunposed to exercise independent 
authority. 
., ____ \-___ : •• ,.:. I • •I ".-!.. •• " ' __ •.::.~~'. :..'.1!'1'--;·_;. ~- 7 ._: \-~·:··-'-< :-:'--•,! '.'C •0° -
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If the aim of a demilitarized world is the elimination of 
- .. - - .. . . :•, . ':'. . 
____ rnili-tar.y. coe.rcion -an- -a -me-ans- -c-f -ad-jus-ting- -the- -re-lat-ions ·of - · J 
!')states, it seems rather nonsensical to attempt to do this 
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qy_ reasse 0bling. th-1.s sr.im8 p0v1,:,r nn an lnterne,tional-level. 
As f.'1illis and Real make abundantly clear; 
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• •• The international peace force ••• must be 48 just that--a police force and not an army. 
This would appear to be the ~ost feasible and viable organiza-
tion of nower in a disarmed world. The~e is no reason to be-
lieve why an international police, acting quickly and with 
certainty and empowered to intervene to prevent or stop 
clandestine rearr;;ar1ent or \Vea pons develop1n0nt, or other s imi-
ln.r violations of a,disarmament agreement needs unchallengeable 
physical might to 1unction successfully. However, perhaps 
the real proble~ in regard to the empowerment of the supra-
'x_..,.. 
national authority is not in dealing with technical violations 
explicitly related to the disarmament treaty, but with actions 
seemingly outside the disarmament treaty. A truly supra-
national force would of necessity be part of a world govern-
ment, and could well be confronted w1th international civil 
wars, coups d 1 etat and other related forms of turmoil. Thus, 
the real qlestion boils down to this. Is the force to be em-
powered to deal with all conflict7 The Soviets have attempted 
, I 
... ·-· l ·,.,..·_:•. ~ .. -~ __ -~ .. ~ 
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to simplify the dilemma by suggesting that the function of 
the international police woud be to prevent all wars ex-
cept those of national rtliberR tion't. Though the United 
\ - - - - -- -- -- -- ... .,... -- ,_ 
continually rejected such a proposal with ind:i.g-
the subversion, the riots, the rebellions, and guerilla wars 
which would certainly continue, if not flourish freely, in 
a disarmed world. Unless, of course, the United States pro-
ooses to establish a rigid "st9.tus quo" throughout the world. 
A Pax Americana, nerhaos? The crucial auestlon and problem 
ls exactly where do the limits of the supranational authority 
lie in the situations just described? 
At the present ti~e the Great Powers have been demili-
tarized by their own weaponry, and are cautiously edging to-
/ 
wsrds what appears to be some form of detente. Certainly 
";-· 
part of this ma·v be attributed to the Cuban crisis of 1962 ,, 
which proved two things. Firstly, what sort of situation, 
with the possibility of mutual scuicide results from direct 
Great Power confrontation brought about by a third minor 
power. Secondly, it conclusively proved the overall superiority 
of the United States strategic military system. The point to 
be made is, that prior to the crisis, and certainly more so 
46 
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afterward, the Great Powe~s have allowed the policy problem 
- - - · t 0 - fa- i 1-, - i f · on 1--;y-- b y d e ·fa 11 l t , ·to · t 11 e ·Un i ~ ~? ~ _ 1~ 9 ~ ~ ~_i1_ s • No t 
- • • - • • - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - -- • -- - • - - • - - • - • - > - • - - - • - - - - - - - - - - • -- - • 
only l·1Hs eacl1 avoided direct militar:y lnter"'vention in tl1e 
-- - - - - --- .. - - - -- .... - -- - - - - - - - .- .-.... - -- - .... - - - - - - - - - - - ----- - ----- - - - - - .. - - - -- - ~ - - - - .... ..- - .... - ... -- . . . . .. ' . . 
seething, highly volattle ~~ttuatlon that is.-.A..f.I,ica, but. 
..:·~....-,- ..... •-
while first feinting action in re_~ard t<? Cyprus, the_y_4..a.Yet ... ft .. __ 
..... .... . ..... ~ ... -.. 
,. allowed the United Nations police force to handle the situa-
,.,. 
tion as they see fit. While being careful not to draw too 
:J close an .analogy, it would seem that a similar situation 
could prevail in a world permanently demilitarized by dis-
armament. The picture drawn by Millis and Real is one of 
a• ,
••• Global system built upon the four or 
five great national power centers that now 
existoocmutually de~ilitarized to nolice-
force levels~ooa minimum of sunrenational 
force ••• to provide a minimum of ora4n in 
the less stable areas of the world. 
Thus, these writers visualize the maintenance of the state 
i 
system, with only small additions to exi~ting institutional 
arrangements as a not perfect, not static, not completely 
non-violent atlernative to the war system. 
William A. Frye supports the creation of an international 
police force, small, and with only a modicum of supranational 
authority. It could serve, in troubled areas of the world 
as an· ,
••• International trip wire ••• placed in the 
- path of an aggressor (5,000 armed passenger 
cars from Russia into Iran), together with a 
,I 
' 
- -
. . . . I . . . .. . 
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.} warning that if 1 it attacked, member states i 
would come to its rescueoooaggressor would J 
have to reckon not mern ly with the force __ " " _ 
1 
_ _ _ _._ .) 
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. -.-- -~ions in which an international I'orce might be required in 
~ ......... ...... ----.,.~~~ .. -.,,"·-·-··a·· ·a··r·sa'rined w6 r1cr·~-... p.ic 'tu re"s' .. a ... 's '1'tu'a't;.io·~··· 'i~· ~hi~h·· o~-;-~·f the . . ...... . 
I Great Powers is seriously and ·,vitally interested butwhere 
the· overwhelming body of world opinion disapproves of the 
action being undertaken.* Assuming disarma~ent has provided 
only.~--~ modicum of supranational authority on the part of th.e 
fore~, then one's reaction might be that the force could 
play no role in such a situation. Nitze, however, feels 
this would not be the case. The reason for inaction would 
I 
obviously be difficulty in facing up to an issue involving 
a Great Power's vital interests. However, as Nitze states; 
••• It can be argued that the availability of 
UN forces, ready and able to move were they 
to be authorizedr would in itself be a factor 
which the (powerJ would have to take into ac- 51 count in estLuating the correlation of forces. 
This point is obviously intimately relqted to the size and 
I 
i 
power of the international force. Charles P. Noyes, in a 
paper entitled, "The Problem of 'Consent' In Relation To A 
UN Force", suggests as a means of circumventi:ig the inferior 
size of the force in a crisis, the com~itment by states to 
supplement the force if necessary. 52 Arthur Waskow, also 
* In the last pr-i'"rt, I discuss a ramification of this, related 
to use of force: the threat of withdrawal frorri dtsarmament 
agreement. 
- - . - . . .. .. 
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makes a similar point. His a.rgumen·t tl1at it may be possible 
to gain compliance and withdrawal from a violation when sup-
._... ~ .... 
though a violator would not be deterred by a force less than 
- . ~ 
... 
'-· - ~-p-c~·:t'-;· :t-t·-··n1ay-ne·-ae·terred if it.is convinced or if it is 
!·, 
. . . . . .. ........... _ 
,.... . , .......................... ·-···. c.;~"t·c:;1°]~·-r1~··tm-c its violation would bring about a greater 
..-,. .. ----, ...... .,... . . .. . .. . . -~ ----· ·'.· ,,. J ---
~ 11 cons ens us". In other words, states rallying to the cause 
along with measures passed to increase the size of the p9licy 
53 force. This is an attempt to overcome what appears to him 
as an insurmountable barrier on the part of Great Powers to 
acquiesce in an all-nowerful force. In regard to the example 
posed by Nitze, and the two contributions of Noyes and Waskow, 
there is, ho~ve ver, one po int which should be mentioned in 
such a Great Power involverrent. It is essentially one argu-
ment for an all-powerful international force. In a situation 
where conflicts began on economic and political levels or sub-
version and attempted coups, the i·r:pending defeat of the. 
smaller nat1on coutd very well drive it and its Great Power 
ally into evasion.and rearmament. Yet, as stated before, 
this may well be viewed as a less dangerous alternative than 
witnessing the overthrow of a vital interest, v1htch is prob-
ably synonomous with both the security of the small nation 
and its protector. The conclusion then is that the ability 
·3 
I - -
\ 
' .. ,/ 
to bring about a renewed arms race could really not be 
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Obviously, this_._iritroduces the qunstio~ o_f_ __ ~q.1;3 "ve ~9 11 .•... :· ..... 
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On the one hand, it ls reaso'1able to u11der~~.n.d 1~rhy it sZ'.vllld 
not exist. By the same token it is hard to imagine the 
United States or the SoviAt Union in certain situations not 
atte~pting tci interfere with any force, which however partial, 
failed to protect and interest considered by the Great Powers 
to be vital. Thus, it would seem only sensible that the 
Great Power "veto", or if not called that, at least some op-
tion which would permit a great power in case of extreme cir-
cumstances to force a renegotiation o.,., the oric:inal disarma-
ment agreer.-Bnt. In order that this veto power not be used 
in thA manner it is used today, for anything and everything 
even vaguely contiguous to Great Power self-interest, it is 
my feeling that if a modicum of supranational authority can 
be agreed upon then 1 t could be made veto-free. Wa.skow makes 
the point that; 
b. 
••• The veto should be so inStituted that it 
would be the opening signal for a renegotiation, 
so tb.at the agreernent as a whole need not dis-
solve, because part of it is violatedo •• t~s 
would be possible to reorder the agreement in 
due reccgni tioQ J5!i2' t changes in the environr.ien t l:ad taken place. 
Lincoln Bloomfield feels that the veto would not necessarily 
-- .. ,. ........... , 
l 
\ 
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hamper the enforcement of disarmament. He states that; 
- - -·-- - -- -- - -
••• The veto at tr1e to·cn1os t nol i t,j P-~ 1 J e ve.1-----------------------. 
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go\terrrrne11 ts v.rot:-tld in the end surely deter-
mine t}1.e re~2onse of the corrJ:tunity to 
violations. '-' 0 
... ·-
~--. - .. 
The whole controversy centering around the "veto" is that 
. ..... 
to bring about effective e~force~ent and order in a disarm8d 
world requires some degree of political conse~sd~. To set 
up an all-powerful supranational authority would require a 
sigriificantly high degree of political consensus and a co~-
plete surrender of tl1e nower to make indenendent internre-
~ ~ 
tations of one's national interest. It is my belief, that 
such a consensus quite apf'arently does not exist today, and 
f'or all intent and purposes, will not exist in a disarming 
and disarmed world in sufficient degree to me-et the requ'ire-
ments of an all-powerful authority. 
There is, however, an alternative way-station prior to 
the final. destinatio11. If it is accepted th.at the widening 
of the political consensus is not an essential prerequisite 
or, for that matter, even a result ·of disarmament, it is 
nossible to conclude that the absencB o:f a nolitical consensus 
could prevent the establishment of political institutions 
·-·· 
.-. 
-~· ~- . -
-
.. ,', ... " ...... '. " ........ . 
capable of effectively controlling an all-powerful armed 
force. In §}1or_t_,. its abs_e_nce _V''10llld pre,,e~t the establish-
51 
before, that wria t is ne ed.ed is a non-governr1e n tal aut~9ri ty ~ 
---
• r ·• ..,,.. • ..-, ......... . . 
one whi6h'06~i6 fit i~ with a supranational aroed .ti .t orce ~ 
-Tom Slick, in his book, Permanent Peace~ A C he cl<: A. nd 
Balance Plan,1,. suggests in an atterr:pt to circumvent unchal-. 
lengablo control authority that; 
••• The world's military forces would be split into carefully proportional divisions between 
"active internatior1al forces", "reserve inter-
n a ti on a 1 for· c e s " !) a 11 d n 11 n t ion a 1 for c e s " , in 
such a r:·:anner as to provide a s7ysterr1 of checks 
and balances against any possible danger of 
the unauthorized use of excessive national 
or international military strength.56 
Slick stresses the importance of international reserve forces, 
for it is because of them that the size of the active inter-
national police fore A may be kept at a minimum. Slick pro-
poses that these reserve forces could constitute perhaps 
.. 
forty per cent of the total world military force, whereas 
the active force would make up perhaps only ten per cent. 
The value of these forces would be that should any world dis-
turbance become too large, these reserve forces could serve as 
a nucleus for re-inforcement. Slick concludes that in this 
manner; 
••• A UN Police Force could be convArted from 
a limited but reasonably effective police 
force o o ointo a pov1erful world peace army 
capable of stemming any aggression. But 
.. 
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0 
this conversion should take place only 
when conditions justir57and only when suitably authorized ••• 
' ., 
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in ~ne ins~ sec~ion 01 ~nis paper, i snaii rerer anu aiscu~~ 
a so-called doctrine of proportiona_lity in constructing res-
- ··-- ·- ........ ·-· ........ ..__ 
---~ ,; : 
I 
.• -,,_ 
-......... ...... ... _ ...... 
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.. ~ ·---.. ....... -,~-.... -.... '. . - ..... -· ... . ... , . .,., . -
ponses to violations. Slick proposes much the same thing in 
Jlt, ... ' ' ' , I • • • • ·:, 
regard to the use of the international police force. 1rhe 
term he uses to describe the principle is "Graduated Re-
active Force". He de fines this as· 
' 
••• The process of bringing defensive reaction 
into play against aggression, with the intensity 
of the reaction geared to its justification as 
well as to suitable authorization·ggaled to the 
severity of the proposed reaction. 
Slick feels that such a program of action would provide an 
a~ditional check against the dartger of excessive international 
power. In general, he envisages four stages co~prising the 
plan: preventive action; international aggression; interna-
tional emergency; and world crisis. To aid in distinguishing 
between the four stages, Slick uses the Koren War of 1950 as 
an example. The first stage corresponds to the situation 
similar to the entrance of China into the Korean War. Finally, 
the fourth stage is related to the situation which would have 
existed had the Soviet Union backed the North Koreans all 
. 
out with nuclear weapons and prepared to attack the United 
States. In each of these stages the authorization of action 
is keyed to the provocative condttion. 59 Rather than go into 
'· 
.-,, J/t,· ',,,) 
-
,; 
.., .. , 
i 
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specifically ~w the Graduated Reactive Force might be ap-
plied here, I have included. the plan at the- enQ of this· paper· 
- ·- ·--- - . -
- • s -----·- _.;; ... ..:..: .. ---~--. ~Lha....f.~~~~8re9ted~~~-,
_ and v1 i 11 h A f'o11 nr1 ~ ~ !: ::::::: :;.- ,~,.,_..:;"' .1. · .i. ::i in -c ere s ed, in the append ix. 
The Lnportant difference between this plan and the plan 
-- -.----· .. 
. pro.pon0d by '.:lre:nvllle Clafk and LElwis Sohn in their exhaustive 
• 1/(#1, ,..... • 
... ----··--trnd we:li.;;tTi<Jugnt·-out s"flldy eI'lfitl;d, World Peace Through , . 
World War, is that Slick does not place all world military 
strength (with the exception of lightly-armed local police 
'\.. 
,·. 
,,,..0 
forces)and including nuclear weapons, in the hands of United 
Nation~. This, I feel, is the great worth of S1ick 1 s Perma-
nent Peace Plan, in that it provides for what amounts to a 
checks and balances system in regard to the nature of the 
........ forces involved and does not , create by delegating all power 
., .... ____ ..,,,_ .. 
and reliance upon the United Nations, a world government. In 
his plan he acknowledges the fact that there is a fundamental 
need for the placing of some sovereignty under international 
control. Significantly, however, he also realize a that "we 
I 60 are not ready for true world government, if we ever will be. 
Eventually, it may be that evolutionary development may 
open the way to the desirability and acceptability of a 
broader spectrum of internntional authority. The power of 
organized international force may be extended at that time, 
., 
or rather over a period of time to handle all conflicts. 
/'. 
-, 
-----
,-. ..... 
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Certainly, however, nothing at this time should be con~ridered 
-················ ........ ---beyond \~'r~3t is irn!Y1ediatel:/ requir8d and pos~1-il1le. for a.succes.s- ......... . 
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not, in fact, will not exist under a world government. Upon 
·~ ~ - -·· --· _..._... 
-
-- ----
·-· 
attainn1ent of a disarmed world, states even then would not 
~j.J,,.I...,.., ...... --- ......_ ........... __ 
be ready for it. They 1-vould still de1r1and some sort of inde-
pendent ability to work out disputes. Gradually, as the 
j 
w~rld lives with disarmament, and a tradition of habit and 
compliance evolves, there may be increasing pressure for the 
/ widening of international powers. Is it not possible to 
visualize, perhaps after a succession of political struggles 
or quasi-wars in a disarmed world, soMe future generation· 
trans forming the n. police only" as pee t of lnterna tio11al au th-
ori ty into a true government with the power and legal right 
to intervene in political and economic struggles between govern-
ments? 
But this, certainly, is too ever far, far into the 
future, and is not to be considered a condition of an original 
complete and general disarmament treaty. 'Nbat then is in 
keeping with such a t,reaty? Briefly, a small but effective, 
adequately organized international police force, whose ad-
t 
ministrative authority, while partly supranational, never-
. •· 
theless does preserve great power flexibility. It must be 
.I ., 
. .I,. • 
o. 
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to count~r violations swiftly, and deal with violations as 
much as possible by not confronting a nation head on. It 
; 
. . . . . " ............... - .............. - .................................. . ............................... -............................................................ . 
upon international "consensus 0 , and ~vhich does not atternpt 
- ..... ...-.. 
.. ___ ._ _ _ 
nations by polltlc~l arrl 
discuss so~e of the problems of co~pliance emanating from 
these points, atte~pting at the sa;-nA ti: ... e to construct some 
general principles. 
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.,:J.· 
:~. 
· .. ~: 
,........,..... ... _ - - .. 
·r,;1 
., -="~- ,"""·--- --- --·· -- -
.• ' (. • ·"'.- '-." -·~, ,_•·_• , :., •. _"rl-".-_:",. ~,i!: ". _., .• ,: _ · . ' "_t_ t ." ';i ." _ :·.: 'f_ .•· _._ ''!~_":,.., _,...l_l_:_ C~ :,.:.. • • - -• -:~,-=·· ."\ _. c; --~·-'"·~ -. _ ,•,.• 0 
56 
' ,· 
-·-
... --~--: ·-·· ;; . ·.,-.:·, .· .. -
-- .. . 
·-·-·--- .. ·- ......... : ... ,., .. , ........................ : ........ ; ....... >!. ............. : ....... ',;,.;·, .. ,·,;,; ... -, ....... ;·.· .. · ........ : .. ,... .. ', .. ' .. . . . . ., -~-. :. . ··- ; . ... . . . . ' 
:I ., ' 
- - - - .. - - • - - - - .~: ""'. -:-· -!':-·.··- - ••• - • - • - •• - • - - - . - ;.,; .• _ •..• -- - - - - •••• -~ • - • ---~--~-' ~ .• _· •-: ... -~'-•_· ...... • .•. -• -~ •.• ~ -: ~ ~- .... ~-· •... , •.. . . . . . . . . .. . ' . . . . . .: ... .- .. -.. . .... --:.- ; .- . -· ... , . . . . . . .. . . . . . 
. ....... _. -·-- }",.,:_ . . .,.. '• ~ . -.. : - .7'; .
. ~ . . . 
.. -----· :-, ·---~--. - .. - . . . - ~ ~ .. ,, .. -.... _..; ··- llll!M,&:. 
.• ;~:-.. ~- :_;... .. :.- ::--,-... ~) __ .. _ -~ :-~·-·-·,,_.;., .. •· ..... . -....-~ ........ -------· :. - ' 
·· . ...-...::..·. ~--
CHAPTER III 
In the city of New York 1ecently, there occurred a 
horrible crime. True it happens every day. Were it not for 
its shocking, startling implications I would not bother to 
relate it. I do so, however, for it dramatizes in miniature 
the very subject with which this thesis is concerned. The 
story itself is simple, yet brutal. A respectable young 
woman, returning home during the early morning hours to her ~ 
apartment in a quiet residential area of New York City was 
stalked: set upon and viciously murdered. The terrible deed 
l~sted for what must have been an eternity for the victim and 
'"t"' 
~- :.., 
~' 
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,I 
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and the thirty-eight witnesses aroused in the apartments by 
tha girl's plea.9-and -screa;;,s- o-f-h61p.-- In-reality:,it-1asted :···· 
111rty-1Ive minutes, until final1.y, licking the blood off his 
fin0ers, the monster .i!:!.m.12eQ__ in hls CRT' Pnd drove £>.\'.'a:r,,.. Thirty-
- __ eight v,ttnesse~.a~d all the;>' could muster was a feeble shout 
from one, 11 le t that girl alone 11 • The police were finally 
called, but not until the criminal had completed his insidious 
task and left the scene. The police arrived almost immediate-
ly but obviously they were called much too late. Vfhy? ~!hat 
really happened was that the people watched and then went 
baclc to bed. They just did not want to get involved. ·It is 
true that not all realized they were witnessing a murder. 
Perhaps a lover's qua:rre 1, thot1ght SO!ne. Others did not hear 
or see enough to reach any conclusion. The plain fact is, 
however, that no one, even those convinced t~t something was
1 
drastically wrong, felt .moved enough to act. The killer, 
caught later, confessed that he reasoned no one would do any-
--· 
thlng to help. Wliien the lights went on and windows opened, he 
merely retreated for a while until things quieted down, then 
went back to finish his grim task. 
Such a story, however far removed from the problems of 
inducing compliance and developing adequate responses to 
./ ... -
~-
!.;,, 
... .. - - - . -
.. 
__ ...... .-... - ·~ .. '"':-~ --- •. 
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violations in a disarmed or disarming world, does illustrate, 
in part, ~he geDeral probl_em inhAre.nt ~n enforcement" The 
I' 
of a domestic police force, or ih our case, an international 
. ~ ~ .. . . - . ·• ....... . . . .... - ·-... -· - ..... 
-- · - ---·peace fo-rce, do-es ~ot --by its ·very nature guarantee that viola-
,.._. -- -··~· .,.., -.............. . 
,......_....___ ·---- - •,A ... ... .. ,. • • •. 
tions of the law or disarmament agreement will not take place. 
Just as a national police will not fully deter crime, so 
neithAr will an international peace force, by itself, deter 
evasion. \/ihat then does? If ~ve go bacl{ to our story, it is 
l_ 
evident that what made the crime possible or rather allowed 
it to succeed was the total detachment of the citizenry. This 
detachment, while not necessarily implying a lack of concern, 
certainly did imply a lack of col1rage, individually and col-
, lectively. Such detachment if permitted do~estically inhibits 
the effective working of the police force, allowing violations 
of law to succeed. The cun1ula tive effect is barbarism, the 
loss of beliefs and the disintegration of a cherished way of 
life. The detacr:unent of the inspectorat~e and verification 
teams of a disarmament agreement, as a result of pressures 
brought to bear upon them, could suffer a loss of courage and 
will to carry out their function objectively. Such a failure 
could bring about a situation in.which non-violating nations 
I 
. -- -- -----'I 
59 
.t 
must surrender to an external force. Just as domestic crime 
J 
_. _. ___ . ____ ...... ___ . is .. de.terr Ad._ by. ti B3·e.s .. on .. th13 .. st.ree. t.'·!_ -plus- --the- -'n-il-1- · to- -a-c-t,- ·-so· --· ---, .... · · · · · · · -· · 
. • . . !.• . 
--~-....---------.----------;--~--;-;----·~-~;----·--·- . -·-------·----- ·---too·-1·:~r-e·\rff~fl·c,ii-ur a disarman1or1~ agreernent by the effective 
-
wor}~ing :1 nd re por t.:.ng of tl1e "e ~v·e s" of the inspectorate ~- Do::. r--. 
-- . ~  
.--·· __ ..... ·-
mestic police enforce~ent will not work successfully without 
' = • - . - .... ... . . -.... . .. -···. 
the co~:1r:l~te cooper:1tion of the citizenry, the "eyes on the 
streot" n1easures to gain compliancn and provide effective en-
forcem'3nt in a disarn12d or disarrning_ world. It 'Nill never 
succeed without effective inspection and verification. It 
is, to coin a phrase, the precondition of successful dis-
ar~ament. Without it, all else falls. 
Therefore, before ~robing deeper into the problems of com-
nliance a·nd enforce1;:ent, I should li1{e to state the first of 
i';\ three assu~ptions for upon these thre~ssumntions any evalua-
t.ion of a disarmament scheme must rest. Firstly, as stated 
above, an effective system of 'inspection and 1 erification 1nust 
exist. ~hether it be ground observer teams, observation satel-
lites, budget anal:fses, or a combination of all three and more, 
is not the concern of this paper. Whatever the system, it must 
be acquiesced in and it must be adequate. Ju.st one note, how-
ever. It would seem, judging from the progress due to tech-
nology, t9at the .argument so often off8red th.at it is impossib:13 
to develop adequate inspection, holds les and less weight. 
:--;.,.,., . 
-- I 
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While admitting that a system delivering absolute success 
... is. r 9 ~at iv~ ly. i.n1 p_o_s_s lt)J.e ., . _it . \Vot1ld - s-A 0--r; - -f.oo 1- is- h -tc· -e ve·ri- ·de·-·· · · · --· · ,- · · -· · · · · · 
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which, slthoush based on relative .r5sks, may be entirely .. •
' . .... . --~--·~--· .. 
.... .; .... - - ·' . . - ... ·-- -
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A 
adequate. In short, it would seem the problems are now poli-
tical ratr·1er tr1an 1techni.cal~ It is my belief that any anal-
ysis of the problems of co~pliance must be predicated upon 
the assumption of an adequate and effective inspection and 
verification system. It is like attempting to start a car 
without an ignition key. Altbough ·someti~es possible, any 
efforts will usually be self-defeRting. So too, in a dis-
srming or disarmed world. The better the inspection and 
verification, the easier it will be to induce compliance • 
/ In this case, the old cliche "ignorance breeds fearn certainly 
holds true. ::.Pt leads to miscalculated responses designed to 
gain or induce compliance, which in turn enhances the possi-
, 
bilities of escalation, leadlng to frenzied rear:11ament, and 
perhaps disaster. 
All this could be the result of a minor violation or 
sequence of violations based upon lack of information during 
a period of perhaps generally deteriorating international 
political conditions. In a world such as~ ours, dealing with 
the vagaries of individuals and nations, nothing can ever be 
.i-····•l, 
. ,/ 
.. 
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certain, there are no black and white guarantees of survival. 
V~e must accept as natural the possi"t>le rislrs of a' disar111ing 
world, and strive our mightiest to deal intelligently with· 
then:v \J~e ca!L.tot afford to be lax. I-t.-""ll!tculd and will call 
.. -
' 
for a continual pledge of.will. 
. ·-:..· .. -
1 9' o _...,.,..., ~ -- ...., .. , t-1, t -~,,,_-f,,,•, ,• , ,.._, ._..,,, •• •..-.,,-., .... -~- ........... , • •, • • -~ • .........,...-T, -· .... . ............. ,.. .. 
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This i~slstence upon an effective inspection, verifica-
tion system leads one to ponder what sort of political situa-
tion may be expected to exist in a disarming world. There 
are differing views. Such a world is mostly conjecture. De-
.pending upon one's view, tl1e approach to evasion and co1npliance 
may necessarily differ. This leads to my second assumption. 
Perhaps it will be clearer if two others held by different 1 
individuals are mentioned. The first is the assumption teld 
by many strategic analysts, among them Thomas Schelling,61 
, 
J. David Singer, and Henry Ikle that the signatori~s to a 
disarmament treaty, headed bJ the United States and the Soviet 
Union are essentially aggressive, and must always mistrust 
each other. Dav id F. Cavers . fee ls tl1a t such an assumption 
may be overdr~\vn. In an attet~pt to stress the positive side, 
62_ 
Cavers, in an arresting paper, assumes and argues that once 
the process ~f general disarmament to peace levels has been 
~ started it vvill· s110\Vball, each step reinforcing and hastening 
the next, in which the ·presently insurmountable problems of 
,_ 
•.9 
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inspection and compliance would dissolve of themselves. 
It is my assun1ntlon or l1elief th~t a state of affairs 
______ ___.,,._:----_____ -=-=-_·----·-·----------·--------------'--"-----'--- -lncorp~~ating both views will be the actuality. To begin 
with, the day vvhen u.nil8teral 1:11e?s_ur~.s h_av:Lng tal{en each _ __ _.-..-,--- - -- . 
-- . ----~- . .. - .• .. . ·-. .......... ··-·· .... _ .• -- --.c-...-, ------ -
nation as far as each is prepared to go, when both nations 
-.-........ _. au • 
sign a disarmarnent treaty, or the first of a series of major 
treaties, so~e sort of a tacit trust must necessRrily be as-
sumed to exist. At least to thA extent that what has been 
negotiated and agreed upon win when implemented work to the 
mu t 1Jal ad·vantnge of each. Such a situation would seem to re-
inforce Caver's nosition. However, it is my belief and part 
·~ 
of my assumption that while trust, ho\"rever easy, may exist, 
agreement will have come about from negative stimuli. Dis-
armainent, in short, wi+l corre abotDJ.t when nations feel th.at 
the risks of the disarmament arrangement weigh not so heavily 
as th8 risks of an uncontrolled arms race spreading other 
nations with the resultant growth of nuclear powers. It will 
cone fro~ the grudging recognition, however hard to accept, 
that clinging to the supposed protections of the war system 
while endeavoring to reduce its impact is, in the long run, 
the worst of all possible worlds. The great nations will be 
\\ 
ultimately pushed and prodded into disarmament by the very 
fear which now impels them to pay dearly to increase their 
J ' ··: . . 
. 
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weapons: the fear of nuclear holocaust. Of course, nations 
__ . _ .. _ .. _ .. _____ . _d_o. not. _just _Ale.c.t c1j_sR.rrr:arri.8n,i;. a.s the- .way. out of -thair dilerrnna. · 
....... -... ,.. 
,. 
( 
simple: in the lor1e_; run,_ e·ither nuclear arrns __ for none, q_r 
nuclear ar1ns for all. Tr1e exarr:ple of France seeris to show 
I -
.... --- ..... -- .... - - ... ,...,.. - . --. -- .. ,, -- --· ..... ,. 
-... -that alliances headed by or1e mighty nuclear po\ver cannot pro-
vide an acceptable repository for its members security, or 
an effective deterrent to its members own ambitions. If, 
,therefore, disar··nament will cor.ie about from negative stimuli, 
how does this relate to the problem of compliance and en-
force~ent? It relates ·r submit, directly. Fear of spreading 
nuclear capability will grow faster, thanks to technology, 
than the acceptance of international regulations felicitating 
compliance. Mistrust will continue to exist in the sense 
that conflicts wil 1 be channeled into different areas. The 
sheer habit of recognized behavior, due to funda1nental diver-
gences in regard to law will simply not exist. Perhaps this 
can best be illustrated by the examples of the driver, alone 
at night on a remote country road who suddenly encounters a 
crossroads "stop" sign. He's positive no one is around,· yet 
he stops. His chances of being detected and punished are ex-
trernely low. There is no question of another's or public 
opinion. What makes him halt is the habit of obeying the law 
" 
-
-
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built up over a period of time. The cold war, from its in-
ceptionj has built a tradition of non-complianc~ between - .... ·-· :- - - - - - - . 
.t,c;:·u . .1 ..) ~ a;19 __ ?{~s_t~_r_n __ Nat-i_on_a ; .. based -le..rgel·y en -C-ornr:1unist · --- - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - -
. - . .. . .. .. .. ". . 
insistence and demand for global superiority. F c.r ,~rears no1, ., 
this nowAr cc,nflict has been reflected along the entire_~ne..a.~-
___. ..... --. 
---... ...... ........... C" - ., ....... 
trum of nation-state conduct. What is in the interests of 
one is contrary to tl1e interests of the other. Unfortunately, 
but naturally; the spectre of this fundamental conflict raises 
its ugly head in all disarmament negotiation. 
~ As I have already lnti·-.,ated the i~pact of weapons tech-
nology in facilitating disarmament will be great and it will 
be rapid. Inexorably, it will effect many changes. The great 
"po\ive r" conflict will continue, though it may assume different 
form. If this silent but certain conflict remains, then it is 
my as sump_t ion that any nation, whether it be the S0oviets, the 
, United States, China or Egypt, will evade a disarmament agree-
ment if it can be evaded. The mutual interest of all signa-
tories would seem to dictate th:lt this should not happen, for 
the rewards of disarmament will want to be preserved and main-
tained. Yet this is perhaps misleading. In a competitive 
world, characterized ·oy conflicting desires, what is to pre-
vent a natlonal fro~-vr reasoning that its s~-¥-interest may best 
be pursued throt1gh successful evasion. vVhether the motivation 
be '"\ve will bury you"(in effect the ambitious overwhelming 
-· l :--.·· 
··1 
~-7-~-. -
·--- ............ 
_.,. .. , -. -· ~- :.\_ :\ ·-
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desire· for aggrandizement) or f~ar, causing the nation to 
. - - . - - . - - - . - - . - ·/- - ... - - . ~ 
/ 
' I 
/ 
at ter: pt e va s 1 on 01.~ t of \Vba t mA y very v.1 ell bA ::l 9 -j n c.~e_L.,.r~Ac__!.,d,4,le....:· -:.._ ______ __... 
--------------l---------------------·---------- ······-·----------·-·- --- ---------·---------------·--------------· - . - ... - - - - - - - -- ..... - --- .. - - . - - - ·-- - - - - - - - - - - - ---------
............... ~Y, .................. s.ire to protect its terlritor1ial l:ntegr•ity, the result v,111 · 
be tho --so.me. Tl1e re vvill cor1s ta11 t pres s-ure to -evads- ·cor1 t1•ols. 
aggressive behavior with no moral or political inhibitions, 
/ 
With Caver's assumption of full cooperation facilitated by 
" 
the onset of disarmament, it may appear unfair to assume in-
stinctly aggressive behavior. However, I do feel significant 
mistrust will exist, a~ it has always existed, between com-
peting powers, large or small. Drawn closer by disarmament, 
in the sense that some tensions will be relieved and some 
fears alleviated, each nation will, however, continue to give 
as little and take as much as possible, competing in relation 
/1..... 
..... /. 
to its rank within the world hierarchy. Because evasion of 
a disarn1ament treaty, if successful, may bring increased power 
and leverage, there will always be a certain incentive to 
evade. In fact, I should think one of the major resnonsibil1t1oo 
of the ruling party in every government would be to keep this 
temptation minimal, not only in regard to itself, but especiall1 
among opposition parties and dissident groups which might use 
the evasion as a political weapon. Therefore it is wise to 
construct beforehand adequate enforcement and compliance 
··s 
-
•I 
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measures or resronses to deter or prevent evasion from oc-
f curring, and to make th8 gains not worth the risks if'it does 
, ' ' 0 I ' I O O • 0 0 • I O • "' .......... - - • • • - .... ~ ._ - - - ~ - ... 
ultimate goal. ~~l1at this really means is that go 1;·ernn1ents 
will be their own ~reatest critics, and will act accordingly 
...... - .... ,~ ... ... t..lfllr&-•... • ...... "·"' ....... .... .... ........ ,:-w •.•. , •. _, . .._ .... , .... '''-' •···• _,,.' 
to keep themselves in line vvith the disar1nament agreement. 
"Self" policing is however far far into the future. I find 
it hard to conceive or' it worl~ing properly at the onset of 
, 
disarmament. In the transitional period, security, trust, 
and faith in the successful working of the agreement will be 
built up by an effective co~pliance system, itself based upon 
:,. .• ~ .. . 
a continual flow of inforrna tion, especially hard facts. As 
~ompliance becomes a habit, and agreed upon principles evolve, 
i~_ will then be possible to begin attempting to· incorporate 
disarma~ent rules into domestic l~w. 
My third assumption deals with wh6 is to implement the 
necessary compliance measures. I do this in the hope that 
it will help to clarify the discussion of the problems of 
compliance which follows. Once a disarmament agreement ia 
reached and the disarming process begins, presumably an 
International Disarmament Organization will be set up to in-
spect, verify, and enforce the agreement. However, throughout 
much of the nrocess its powers of enforcement will of necessity 
have to be ba·cked up by the Great Powers. To thts intent they 
will, I feel,' play· a decisi,te role in bringing about compliance. 
.  . 
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It is my assu~ption then, that while obviously based upon 
-- - - -- --·.· · · .,. ·, · · - · --rnutua 1 i-11ter·e s·t, co~1 pliar1ce vvill also have to be fou11ded 
.__. .... ···--·-- ... 
1--------------------------------------------------
on concepts of deterrence. In essence, each side must de-
.. 
/. 
- . --- - - ~- - - - - .. _ ......... - ..._ ... ~ -- - - -- - - - - .._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - ... - ........ --- ... -.. -.. ------... -- ~--- .. -· ....... --
ter -t_he other frorr. ch_e_a_t1:n.£, or tnh.lb-1 t fiJT1tl1er viola ticn, 
with the prospect of its countermAasures. 
---~ --· •.... . .. '· ... 
- -
V~itl1 tl1ese three assumptions in mind, I should like, be-
fore analyzing some specific problems related to compliance, 
to speak in general terms of the nature of compliance. It 
would appear that no individual or nation· is inclined to at-
temnt what he or it has good reason to believe cannot be 
achieved. The principle which comes to mind is that the ide~ 
of enforcement or measures to induce c.oppliance ought to be 
based upon this proposition. Compliance measifres, in pa.rt, 
should perform a preventive function. In essence, measures 
to gain complia~ce are counter-measures, and to be effective 
in the face of an actual violation they must have a restorative, 
yet also a punitive effect. Compliance measures in order to 
legitimately perform their preventive function must restore 
whatever gains have occurred as a result of violation and 
penalize the violator in the sense of inflicting a loss upon 
him for being u.nsuccessful. Cesare Beccoria, in a paper en-
titled, "An Essa·y on Crilnes and Punishments", written in 1761, 
mal{es an interesting comr!ent in regard to this matter. Though 
-
speaking of domestic cri~A, it is appli~able, I feel, to 
.i. 
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.1ntArnational affairs also. He states; .J . -~ 
---- -·---------- ----- ------
••• The intent of punlshrrlents- ls- not- -t-o - - ·- ··-· -· - - -· .. ··- - - - -·· -· - - -.. . . . . . . - - - ,-~ 
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cri~":8 COr1~~11i tted I} o o tl1r::i P 11d. 0 f -run l S l11rent is 
to P r~e v·e D t the C 11 i rn ina 1 ( na ti O 11) f l_:;-Ora- ·-d-O J.n-g ------""-. ~:~,--.. ~ .~ -:- 7" -:·.;...;. .; _ ... -·-- - - - - •• - - ~ ::'. 
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Cri~es are moro effectuall·v nreventsd by 
.....,., ... ..,.,._. ...--...-. ~-· - • ,_ .... 1 ...... - .. .,. •• _\,•l:r11•p,,-, ..... .,. ........ .,.~.,.,.-- , . ,. , . , , . . .• , . , . 
th A ce r ta j_ 11 ty ·tl1a -r1 thP s e verit.:y of :1L1ni sh-
men tao o Tl1a ta punlsl1.111er1t 1nay· be ,9.n act of 
. 1 r, f i ~ D t vio ence 01 one or o many ega ns~ a rriva e 
mernber of society, it shou.ld be public im-
m e d i a t e , a 11 d n e c e s s ~§~I ; the 1 ea s t po s s i b 1 e 
in the case give11. 
Though I shall atte~pt to explore several specific aspects 
and problems of co~pliance, th~s quotation appropriately an-
; 
<j 
ticipR.tes and highlights several \111i th vvhich I shall deal, 
namely, prevention by certainty rather than severity, the 
nroblem of im:nediacy, and the problem of proportio11ality 
with which in1.-rnediacy is vitally linked. Tl1is then, as stated 
by Beccoria is the' fundamental nature of compliance. If this 
is tl1e nature of compliance, then certainly one major criteria 
of the compliance system's success, as indicated by J. David 
Singer· :lfn a thoughtful pa per entitled, "Ins pee tion and Pro-
tec ti on in Arms Reduction" will be tl1e degree to which decision 
makers will be outweighed by the probability of detection and 
failure • According to Singer; 
•. 
••• The potential evader, in order to be de-
terred frorr such an atte~pt, must esti~ate 
that 1NhPn ho corn.b3_nes the lo~r pr·obab:tlity of 
,-., ] ,. • t• I i "I J_ 1 success1u. evasion v,r1 .r1 r.r1e rnuoeraL,e va ue 
1
' ( u ti 1 it y ) of s u c 11 s 1__: cc e s s , it rnu s t a :pne a r· 
srnallr-:r tl1ar1 tr1e col':)bined rro1Jability of de-
~ec tio1! ( ht,ih) and the d isutili ty of such 
ae tee ti ---i~. 
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It would sf1em that the more carefully and thoroughly com-
-· 
plia:nce :responses -iri -terms of enforcement pr-ocedur-es are de-
- . 
signed, tho lesJ likely such a s:yste:-,: 5..':I Likely t0 be used. 
Th 1 s re for s '.:12 c le t ,1 th .q._ d-e-te rr r. ne;6 ~b.r o ugh . c;:_e !:' tf.i fn_t y _ pr in.,. 
--- . . ~ . . . . . '"• . . . 
c i nle • Howe v e_r, _ t hi§ s )1.ou 1 d n n t b,., t :11.J:3 '!:.-ta ::-;,:: s.:-r-t~ia t-".:ry 
its very nature, n well thought out and carefully prepared 
compliance response will absolutely deter evasion. This re-
--· 
. fers to the 11 quPstion of gajns, if succes!;iful, losses .if not" 
aspect. It is another reason which indicates that if the 
compliance system is to work adequately at levels short of 
enforcement of major, substantive violations by an internationa 
pP.ace lorce, or failing the presence~~ such, by Great Power 
initiative, there must be strong e~phasis upon a phased and 
balanced disar~ament system which at no ti~e upsets the ap-
proximate !;!ili tary parity of the major signatories. Thus, 
there would be no added incentive to evade, as there would be 
if at any time disparities appeared. A balanced system allows 
the non-viola tor to inflict some kind of retaliatory punish-
rr.ent. Henry Kissinger, in Foreign Affairs, 1960, makes this 
pc int; 
•• • The equilibrium should be established at , 
a lAvel at wl1ich 11 str'2tegic sdvnntage can be 
gained only by such a substantial violation 
that the li~elihood of its going undetected 
is very small. The gonl should ·be a stable 
balance of forces s 1-1ch ·f°11fi t deterrence vvill 
l_ 
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!!·i, not fail even if the agreement is upset. __ ·- ___ .· ______ . _ ~ v_i o l '?it i o 11, in s 1:-1.0 r. ~-s .s l1ol1 ld --s -tar t a·n · a rrr,-s · ~ --· ~ -_ -_ --· ·- -. --- ---~ -· -. · · · ·-·' -----· - __ .,- - · · -. -·.- - · ra r, 8 _ n r!.d no t a 1Ha r It oo 
-. . ._. 1 
___ ......:__ _ ~~~~~~~----------~--- I By its very n8tu~e compliance iTiiplies a. conscious 
,_- .. -~ - .. ---
6A 
. 
• 
res ting pe.pe r, tt a hoped for 1re·\vard. · .,, After a violation has 
occurred a nation's decision to comply or not to comply with 
a compliance measure will be ~ffected by what amounts to a 
hoped for"advantage from co111pl;{ing, and negatively, a feared 
disadvantage from non-coTnliance. If the decision to comply 
is made, the signatories will probably feel that a good bar-
gain of mutual benefit to all, has been struck. In many 
cAses the p8rties are sure to regard it as a good bargain 
for essentially different reasons. It would seem that the 
violator's reward, in part, is a negative one, in the sense 
that the threat of punishment, perceived by it as certain, 
would be lifted when it has chosen to comply. This certainty 
of punishment coupled with the positive rewards of complying, 
·1 .• e. the maintenace of the agreement, and the prospects of a 
costly ar~s race are factors which would induce compliance. 
In essence, "fear of the consequences", is a major aspect of 
~ the nature of corrpliance. 
The recognition tmt in many instances lawlessness would 
breed la~vlessne~1s is a cogen:t deterrent to evasion, if so 
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communicatAd to the violator. This illustrates the fact 
nl·iance. 
" In exnressing itself in both positive and nega-
. . 
t 1 v c '?J a :1 ~ , it i a l n · -rr12. 11y ca s e s - .. cne a Y-1d "t-fle sarne with deter-
it would see1'1 that the distinction Gene Lyons attempts to 
niake in his paper, "Tl1e Problem of Cort1pliance Under Arins 
6'fl. 
Control Agreements 11 , between deterrence concepts and con-
cents of rrutual interest in securing comoliances does not 
really hold up, with the exception that mutual interest does 
& 
allow for some form of tacit·trust, whereas deterrence does 
not. 
• I 
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CHAPTER rv 
.\ 
~et us now consider some general problems associated 
with resnonses designed to gain compliance, a·na to attbmpt 
to construct some general principles designed to guide in 
the formulation of effective compliance measures. 
I 
lviy initial assumption w~s that for compliance measures 
_ .. 
to be given the greatest opportunity to succeed there must be 
an adequate and effective system bf inspection and verification. 
,. 
Hovvever, it is also taken for granted tm t such a system will 
not be able to provide absolute security. It will be based 
upon relative risks. Therefore, it is possible tr.iat there 
be mutual acquiescence in allowance for evasion in c~rtain 
.. J 
If 
) 
---
, •. 
' 
·, 
well-defined areas of the agreerm nt. T~e reasoning here, 
_1_& _ t_o __ legalize. _'sh.at is .. lne.,rite.ble an-y'Nay·- -and- there-by-s-eek 
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~~--~~~--~~~~~---~-to ul·i.11g-i--t;-1.1rfto the open, rattier than to keep lt clandestine. 
In actualit-y~ it \vou.ld merely be a means of tension-11 e.d.ucti..on.,. .. 
-by admitting thqt in certain areas it would not be possible 
..... ~·.,: -~~· .,,. ..... ,... --- . ., ; .. ' .. 
--
__... -·--
to detect minor, relatively insignificant evasion. Obviously 
this arrangement would only be agreed to if the parties felt 
that it would be possible to detect a significant increase 
of evasion in this area, and thus be able to cope with the 
latter. By allowing some leeway at a low level, some measure 
of flexibility is preserved. However, it is possible to .en-
vision cases where problems of compliance could arise. How 
does one treat behavior which begins to exceed the leev1ay 
tacitly agreed to? When such an instance occurs, it may in 
fact be difficult to prove conclusively· that a violation has 
occurred. Evasion which, though not yet of significant pro-
! ' 
portions, may be felt to be under way. A case such as this 
is an excellent example qf the fact that co~pliance measures 
must neither be non-existent or overly stringent. Analogous 
to this situation is the case of the clear-cut violation which 
confers a concrete gain, achieved through a short-time period. 
Her is the case of a definite violation, yet one which, due 
to extraneous political circumstances~ may not necessarily 
r 
' 
•' 
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·pos.e a visible threat to the signatories of the agreement. 
. . 
Perhaps it is executed b7 a secondary power, or-even a Great 
___ ,_..;..;,;.~----------
i 
. \ 
Eower georgraphically removed S·O as to cause concern only to 
whe.]'J~ a re soJ..1J tj on ·_t..o_.a ct .. mfl.y n.o t -bA f orthc-a~i·ng. It ;!'1ou ld-~·-- ,,,_ -· _ .... J · 
--·· . - -- -l(!f -- -· 
apr,ear, though, that in both cases some action is technically 
necessary in order to deter further evasion, and perhap~ ulti-
\ 
mate breakdown of the agreement, since other nations in the .l 
face of continuing violatio11s would want to retaliate by re-
ciprocal non-compliance. Such action fanned by fear and 
' 
iY 
seething emotion might well bring on a rush to a final ignition 
of conflict or at least a major breach of ·the agreement~ It 
is preci8ely here that a control agency may prevent such an 
occurrence, or where the non-violating nation required a viable 
! 
doctrine of proportionality to facilitate and guide in making 
its response to trn viola tor. 
vVha t'· this means in essence is that responses designed 
~ 
to [ain compliance must fit the viol8tion which has occurred. 
The "nunishment must fit the crime". Such a doctrine 111ould al-l. 
low for certainty of punishmeDt, thus insuring that whatever 
particular response fits·· the situation it will be irrnnediate. 
Immediacy· and certainty are two important benefits sucl1 a 
• 
doctrine confers. They are, in fact, a part of it. In the 
,...-.-· 
.... . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 
..... --· ·,._:~: __ ·.:.. ··- . 
-~,_--c-.···-- .-- ... ~-. ·-- .-,·-· .... -· ... --... : ...... -- ,~·---.-- - ·~· .- : ,--, . 
.. · 
first case illustrated therefore, it would appear that a 
response nroporticnate to the occasion would be the intenai- ,\, 
· · 1 cat or1 o !' inspection and verif ica t-ion- · -pr·oeedu·re·.---·--ThJ.-s-·u-.r-.-~.---.·--~~~~------~~----.·.··.· ...... 
itself mav well deter the_ v~ol~tor. whose respons~b!l1ty-it f. .• • • . --- -. - . --·. • .... ~-·- . 
• 
would be, recognizing th8.t he could not c@ntinue without 
--------
,--.---
further ~enalties, to give reassurances of his compliance, 
1 t vvould in short nut him on notice. The second case points 
up the fact that a clear-out violation, for example, pro-
duction of weapons outlawed by the agreement, may be effect-
ively deterred by a response suited to it. In this case, it 
could be confiscation of the weapons by the enforcement agency. 
\ 
In situations such as these, however, it would appear 
that restorative measures should also be accomoanied bv some 
.L u 
form of retributive measure, desj_gned to discc,,7_rage further 
evasions. VVithout such a response, any nation may-well be 
actively encouraged to violate, knowing all that can happen 
is a return to the original position. The violator is thus 
no worse off than if he hadn't violated. A vivid analogy is 
/ that contributed by Henry Ikle. In essence, the violator is 
playing the game of "Heads you lose, tails we' re eve nu .68 
The doctri~e of proportionality is one answ~r to the problem 
of making resnonses vi1ork. Stich a doctrine, if thoroughly de-
veloped, would lessen trn chance of inaction. Rather than 
/r .. ( 
--
~.,. 
. .. . 
. ··--·----
,,,.._. 
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' ·('.· 
paralyze the resolve (will) to act, _it, inould embolden it. 
If utilized properly, it would surmount the dilenur.a resulting 
from 1At1-·jnr;· ornnll ...... 1Lt-0-1n_.f..-t,... .. cs- r.Jfr.1~ b· V .r·1~-"'}-~·-·r..1.v.e . .J::-:;:. •. u.'.l:}0h9cked·u·--··--················ .. ···""·" 
--- ~ _.,,,,_ ___ -------- -.. .. L ..•. -1. - -c:, -J ,;\.-._,-,. - :--=---- :'~.':'--:1:~.&._1_ -·-., .!:,-'\~.•J••. t,-·- . • J~-,.J v • • 
In such c2.ses, the non-viola tor, acquiesing throughout in the. ______ _ 
- - ~ - ·-· 
__ ..... 
interest of preserving the disarmament agreerrent, might find 
........ . -· - .............. '• _.....,. ________ ···- ...... - . .._.._. ..... -
itself in the uneasy position, its back to the wall, of having 
to threaten withdrawal, accompanying the threat with actions 
perhaps unpqpular, such as rearmament measures to restore 
\ 
the balance, or the alternative of accepting gradual political 
surrender, and continued erosion of its power and prestige. 
I submit t'hat such an unpleasant predicament may well be 
avoided through the doctrine of proportionality. It is an 
instrur.ent by which the evasion problem may be met early, 
analyzed, and successful action initiated. If this is done 
,• 
the rewards of disarmament wiJ,.l conceivably be great. If not, 
they may well be horrendous. 
To further illustrate this doctrine, it is possible to 
envision a c::i se · where the threc, t of· superior force may fail 
to achieve complianc8. Let us assume that the threat comes 
from thA enforce~ent agency having at its disnosal an ade-
··~ 
() . qua tely formulated peace force.- The danger is that an external 
. threat of violence in retaliation against what it c0nsiders 
to be a serious violation may strengthen instead of weaken 
the hand of the violating nation. This might b~ because the 
' 
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errant government perceives the compliance measure in an en-
tirAly different lf[;ht than was irLtc~r1ded by the enforcement 
-------- - ·---· --··· - -· ----------- -
-
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f. 
• • • \~I ho re a t hr e a t o f c 0 n s e q, u e n c e..s_.\l+!-,-9 .z c. ~ p:-t -
------,able _ to t...b.A co1J n try ( v i.olo. tc~~r) 13 no G. c cJr1-
c on it~ n t of consequences unacceptable to the 
off.. . .i_c 18.1 s :-:~-Y-i~G- ~.tl-~s .... 3 ec-4..1 i·e,n· arre· c-oLtlL1 ex-pect the threat to nrove lneffective.69 
-~. 
This may be especially true for dictatorial 8overnments. 
..-.... .... 
Wha. t appears as a violent threat may further entrench the 
elite group in power. In fact, if faced with a rival fac-
tion in contention for power and seeking a reason of substance 
as a vehicle for overthrow, a party and its individual leaders 
may Wlclll be pressured to defy rather than comply. In a case 
' such as this it may well be that a more modest threat appro-
priately devised and directed at the governing officials 
might produce the desired result. Perhaps a vivid example 
:·. :.;_: ... 
of just such a situation, though the thredt of force is missing, ········ 
is the present Panan:anian-Uni ted States clash over land right. 
If the United States starts from the assumption that the mat-
ter is o~e affActing its great nrestige and ability to main-
tain recognition as a world leader, such a premise would 
seemingly dictate a hard, give no quartAr position, ono which 
would, if judged from afar, look like another instance of a 
small, nowerless nation meekly giving way to its innnensely 
~' . 
I 
,, 
_I 
I 
I 
. 
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powerful neighbor. Seemingly, this is all Panama could do. 
Ye-t, thA do1110stic situation ln Panama h-'1s caus_ed her to···react ·--····--- ... ·_·:·_·:·_·_ 
--· I a,,,vi.0 t:i Ylf_.f' . ~0.LLt.i.cq 1 . ..;~~n.11 p.~ h!" C'1 J..~nnnd ir. 
~"' .. "\. u - - - - O J. _,,, - _::.-...:::1 -- - - c..J .. - -A- ....,, ' • _..... ~ - v. -
an aggressively defiant attitude toward the United States. 
The result of such an unfortunate situation has been that the 
overly stiff attitudA and behavior of the Unitod States, based 
in part on a failure to recognize how its position would be 
~ 
perceived by Pa11an~1a, has sArved to strengt}1en/the hand of the 
Pa11amanian Gover~.11nent a11d caused it, for domestic rAa3ons, to 
defy the United States. The irony of the whole tension-ridden 
mess was that Unit~d States ov8r-action was largely unnecessary. 
A r.:or8 tnodera te stance may we 11 have brought sa tis faction sooner 
to all parties. It would seem that fundamentally both nations 
• 
are amenable to a just solution, and certainly would like the 
episode to e11d on a note of n~utual understandir,g rather than 
/ 
biting recrlminat 
Such an exa·~ e indicates thBt tl1ough a significant vio-
lation has occurred in a disar~ing or disarmed world, the vio-
lator, when confronted with the evidence that he has wiolated, 
might bA convinced of thA advantagAs of complying, not by a 
threat out of line ~v.ith what has occurred, but lJy a 1neasure 
\Vhicl1 is in pro:1ortion to the violation a.nd \Vhich stimulates 
... ...... ~.-.:~~ 
-,,. .. ' 
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him to acquiesce, not defy. 
... .............. -:-· 
There is one danger, ·however., It .is thA error of not 
. ·- ...... - ...... ·-·--····· ---··---~------------
. - -
..... ______ . ___ ;. "; .-.,~.;'." .. -·- -. -mal{ing --oc-m-p-1-ia:nce···me-& sure-s- --s-t 1'l·or1g· · ·e·r1ouf;-h~- ·· ·1·n r)ro_po r ti O!l to 
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it 'h"ill be d i_f-f icul t to cons true t a symmetrical evasion-com-
pl iance s:rstem. If suci1 ls the cqse, necessity might dictate 
that it would be better to err on the side of an over-nunitive 
scherre. Anything else, occurring over a period of ti1ne 1nay 
well increase, rather than decrease the incentive to evade. 
Although proportionality outl1t to be kept in mind, it must 
be, I fee 1, a general principle thB. t for ea ch leve 1 of viola-
tions the compliance system must be so designed as to make 
the evader pay a stiff price; a price he would not willingly 
be inclined to pay at any time in the fu turs. 
To· takn tl18 exte1,,r1al threat. of violence as a compliance 
measure one step further, I would like to discuss in detail 
the nature, the problems inl1erent in, and the i~plications 
of a threat of \Vi thd:rawal from a comnl~ te and general disarma-
ment agree~ent designed to induce comnliance. In addition, 
I shall try to rel~te it to the doctrine of proportionality, 
attempting to draw up certain conditions when it would seem 
to be most .. effective. This analysis is based on the assu1?1p-
tion that a threat of this ~agnltude may only be possible or ) . . .. 
conceivable under bertain conditions. 
< 
. "\'., 
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Thi first thing t~t can be said in regard to the t~eat 
to withdraw ls that it is cons idored to be the log lcal answer 
v.i.u.1.u~.i. 'n or pattern of' violations unhindored over a 
period of time. Currontly the trend seems to te~d toward froe 
~ -- - ·-
withdrawal as the ultimate sane tion. What ls imnortan t is tba t 
such a threat has been described in vague, rather general terms 
with seemingly little thought given to its effectiveness, or 
f0.1lure in certain instances. Furthermore the case for with-
drawal seems to rest upon the principle of national interest 
as being ultimate. Yet one can certainly envision disarmament 
having reached a position where a significant degree of nationa 
sovereir.;nty has been transferred. In such a situation, con-
fronted with a serious violation, it is hard to foresee even 
a great nation making its threat to withdraw credible. In fact, 
it is by no means possible ·that at such a stage the Complaining 
nation may well find .. itself thEi, villain, not the hero. 
I 
Morever it is often assumed that the general desire to 
maintain the agreement will be great on the part of the other 
nations involved. This may not be the case. The contrary may 
well be true. The simple reason is that most of the time 
throughout the disarmament stages there will always be so11e 
form of minority pressure to withdraw. Even now, in 1964, there 
are increasing doubts and increasing pressure emanating from 
:..·: 
............ ··; •·.. . .. 
--- , -- --·--·-- ~--~---v- ~-., .... 
• -~·- ~ ..... • .. - .. ---..--.... ·--• .--~· ••• - .-........... - ............ ,, • "' t ............... "' .... , ..... ~ ....... ,. ''"' •••••••• '. 
....... •,• ••• ' .... ' > 
' 
..) certain circles to withdraw fr9-r, the teSt ban agreement • 
Louis · I-Ier1k·ln -·ha ·s · ·stated · tlia t";" · · · · · · · · . . - - . . . .. .. . -
_ ..... ln- :1an. :,- ins 4;a.-ne-e s- -ade-q era b,i L'e s DcYrtS e S 
70 could oe so~·1ethlng less than abrogation. 
.-.. ----- -- - . 
This- ph1·a3e- i(nould be ,-r:od ifiad to the extent that I'esnonses 
"must" be so[~eti:1in1:, less than abrogation. In tr~:ing to get 
around this problem, Roger F1ish~r has -proposed thB.t disarma.-
. 71 ment en forcAment measures be negotiated in advar1ca. ·rhe 1 
reasoning behind .. thi~ is that the first ti:.rne violations are 
detected reason may give way to panic, resulting in hastily 
conceived threats of withdrawal. I do not think this is a 
solution. The United States and the Soviets have enough 
trouble as it is reaching agreement without having to nego-
I tiate •,even more measures which would reduce their policy flexi-
bility during the onaet of disarmament. In addition, agree-
ment on all possible violations is impossible anyway. A 
major drawback to trn threat of abrogation is the liklihood 
that the response to detected evasion would mean a short-lived 
disarn1a111ent system. This is precisely where the doctrine of 
proportionality fits in. Intelligently utilized, the violator 
may be deterred and tte balance restores without having to 
"kick over thEl traces" by withdrawing from the agreerrant in 
the belief that only in this way may security and other vital 
interests be preserved. 
•I f 
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In keeping with this~ Robert Nield makes the interesting 
' •··•• I., 
point in 'fi ,pap,"lr 8ntitlcd, ttcheating In f,. Disarmed World"; 
.• 
---·--·····--------- t-f=.i:2'. t -~ i'l~j f&-a·r-·-uf--3 Ul• prise attack OC curring a. S 8. re 8 Ult Of 
---- ----------------··· ........ . 
succnssful strategic evasion by a ~iolator, is in reRlity a 
-· 
Yjr"l - - - ... - - -. . .,. -- -
bOgey. .... J.Iet offers several valid reasons why a viol~tor may 
---··· ----- . 
---
--. ........ ·- .,111 •• •• - ......... _.._.. __ _... 
not be able to act. One implication of this is th.at it may 
well be nossible to maintain the disarmament agreement in es-
.. II!, .. 
sence, for the non-violator will be given time to adjust his 
position so as to line up with that of the viol~tor. Nield 
stresses the point that the non-violator would not necessarily 
be defenseless and unprepared. If this is true, there would 
be no need to abolish the disarmament system, althouc·h it C> 
may take a while to get -the nations back to the status quo 
ante which existed prior to the violation. Nield indicates 
that the non-viola tor, in this case the threatened nation, 
may not be defenseless, in the sense that the violator cannot 
be certain tffi.t his victim has not hi~self violated, and thus 
could perhaps be able to retaliate in force if he had to. 
Ca ... ses like this, point up the ~ntriguing notion put forv1ard 
.,. 
by Clark Apt that the best military strategy of the future 
73 
will be verifiAd dis.ar1nament. If the violator cannot be 
sure that his potential victi1r1 bas not violated, the victim 
., 
may indeed be able to call the evader's bluff, deterring him, 
while gaining valuable time in whi.ch to reach an equal position,. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... 
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Ironically, there fore,-- .as 1~1a1:1 makes clear, the cheater may 
• 
---kno'uing l1e may very 1nell suffer a counter-attack. One may 
-
-
-
-
-
- ~-. ---
.- < 
·-. 
-
-
. try t-0 ri.rgue tint 9-UCh an · axaJnple Joe S not hold Up under the 
-· _, .-..- ··-CDl".i~lJeratio1-.1 •t*i:ta~ aS B. moral nation W8 -~wuid -not attemr,t t 
to evade, but would adhere to the disarmament agreement. It 
-
is by no means absolutely clear that any nation, including 
the United States would not engage in some measures of evasion 
or at the very least pretepd that it bad done so when faced 
by a violator. 
It is my feeling that there are two general conditions 
under which abrogation of the disar~ament system may be jus-
tified. The first has been partly undermined by the pre-
ceeding analysis. It is in respodse to a violation of the 
disarmament treaty so serious as to immediately call into 
question United States domestic security. However, it may 
well be that once serious violations of this magnitude occur, 
the desire to preserve the basic disarmament agreement may 
be impossible. As such, the threat to withdraw 1nay just be 
confirmation that the· disar1nament sys tern has ended anyway. 
The second condition is which the threat of withdrawal may 
be justifiable, would be, for example, if a completely dis-
armed worl9 were to act as a stimulus for Corrmunist expansion 
. ~ 
' , 
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in this manner ~ight well decide that disarmament was a bad 
bargain aftAr all. 
1 r · u u 1- e 1 n ~ · ~ u c; l . tJ tj •J -
- --- - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .._ - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - . - . . . . .. - - - -
tion of v11.tl1dravv1al under these two conditions are se\reral 
and bear analysis. To a certain extent the credibility of 
...... . . . ... ..... --··· .... " ... ' ... ,:.· . . · ...... 
the threat of abrogation is especially woven into the type 
of world disarmament would bring about. It seems fair to 
reiterate that the Great Powers will continue to exert a 
dominant influence in such a world. However, an important 
point to cons-ider is the role of the uncom1nitted, neutral 
and underdeveloped nations. Certainly they play a signifi-
cant rqjl"e in a rapidly changing vvorld today. Dynaniic nation-
, alism, the T~iJestern desire to detach itself from the stigma of 
colonialism, and the fact that, in large measure, two power-
. ful nations are fighting a "cold war" to win their support, 
through foreign aid or coup d'etat whichever suffices, has 
placed those small nations in an unusually strong bargainlng 
position. Each, in turn, is wooed and cultivated much like 
. "-·-· '" "' ··t•-' 
a woman and the smart nation plays both sides for what it can 
gain. Nevertheless, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union have managed to act on occasion with seemingly little 
concern about the influence of their moves upon the posture 
they ceaselessly strive to maintain in the eyes of the un-
committed nations in t·he final analysis know they vitally 
0 
, .. 
' . ' 
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• 
need the support of tl1e Great Powers. The IIungarian Revolt 
0 ~ , nr: G • J. _LiJt..' ' tl1e Be1·1 in t •• -..'all; nnu tr1e Cuban missile crisis of 
----------~---=------------------------·-----·----------------------------------1 
________________ ~ _____ -.19'32 __ g_~f'- - .c 2.:E!~.S- :t 11 - po i.nt~- ---C.e~:r-ta-iE-ly- -the- -n bo r-t i-·?s- -C-aba-n- -in·1a--- --- - -- ~..; -· --- ---
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si0n of 19.6l,-- its -~~mana·~p~~nt ~1·a 11~t1e to : . .Li.:) Lt r5......,.,, . ., U l., en-
\ 
11.ance United St3.tes prestige qbroad. llovvever, the noint is 
--- --- -- .. 
. . caw....... .. •. ~ r· ••• ~ ' • . . ' • ' ' \•' . 
that in a d isarn10d \Norld, the influence of the poorer, uncom-
mitted nations will become even greater. The great economic 
rewards that disarmament would bring will certainly give rise 
to dci11ands by the _poor nations that they be better provided 
74 
for,,. Even now we see an inlcling of this in the recent April 
convening of the first iJorld Trade Convention in Geneva at-
tende.: by rich and poor nations alil{e, a meeting at which · 
underdeveloped countries began their first relatively organ-
ized demand for preferential t rea tme nt. 
All of this has irnplications for a successful threat of 
withdra\val from a disar1nament agreement. It is my belief 
that tl1ough each na. tion will categorically declare upon the 
sif;ning of such a document t.bat it reserves the right of with-
drawal, it may well be that once disarmament has made signi-
ficant headway, nations, especially large ones, will be under 
terrific pressure to stay within the agreement. Thus locked 
in, the t~reat of withdrawal would not be effacacious. If 
them, in, a situation in vvl1ich a violation is not of such large, 
, 
/ 
.. 
'• 
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proportions as to threaten directly and immediately the 
security. of all nations, but 011e wli~.cl1 is nevertl1el 13ss ser'ious 
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be the cons eqnenca.s of a Un.lted StatAs thrA~~ to \l'll.t_h.dra\v from 
... '-ff 
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the agrAeme nt? 
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To begin with, perhaps because the violator has gone to 
····· 
the trouble of confusing as much as nossiblA the exact nature 
and scope of his evasion, of making his violation ambiguous 
or of justifying it on the basis of violations by another large 
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nation. If we assume in addition thRt tl1e duties and pro-
cedures of the International Disar~ament Organization may prove 
slow of implementation, precious ti~e may slip by. If the true 
nature and ramifications of the situation are not clear there 
is every reason to suspect that different ways of handling the 
situation in terms of resnonse measures will exist. In such 
a case, trn United States v1ith a large world-\lvide security in-
terest, would be in a rather d iff icul t pos 1 tion. If the United 
States was convinced that w-~thdrawal \Vas the answer., ·it might 
be faced with a situation where the burden of abandoning the 
agreement would be placed upon it, not the violator. Su.ch a 
threat brings up the whole problem· of escalation with all the 
~ 
anxiety and fear it entails. It mig~t be used as an argument 
to prevent United States action. Certainly it is possible to 
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envision the uncommitted nowers as unsymp~thetic to avowed 
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ly as th~ Unlted Ststes sinc8 they qre not thP objArts of 
Soviet hostility as is this country. This is even the case 
today. Tr1e fact tl1at sorie of our NATO allies rnay have come 
close to oroclairr:ing neutrality in the Cuban crisis is one. 
rather vivid illustration. Just how do you cor.vince all nations 
to feel as strongly the leading status quo power as us, that 
their interests are affected by a violation? 
I~nllcit in this problem is th8 ~rinciple that under con-
ditions such as we l1ave here, violations and counterr.~easures 
may well be viewed, if not in the same, at least in a similar 
light. The nrob.len1 is further comrounded by the fact that 
' .J 
there are bound to be revisionist nations scattered throughout 
the r1ierarchy of powers. The "Cni t8d 3 ta tP.s, -- to thrvr,ar t 
; 
or .nullify Soviet gaJns by abrogation, might contribute indirec~ 
ly to tr1e aims of these oth8~ states. Convinced that its re-
prisal is not only for its own sake but for the fre edorn and 
safct~/ of peaceful nations alike, it would require a strong 
belief, a firm faith in its capacity to lead, and a willingness 
\ 
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to bear the sacrifices responsibility entails. 
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tl1e "hau11ting f:1ar of tl1e 30' s". Stq tesrnen_~_re!::e.,1bAr the 
- -
r:i sgu idea· re'"' S CJ'-1 i ng, the \Vis l-1ful t hi ri1(inf, in the face Of h8 rd 
-
•w=• .... -----
4 fa c ts w },;_ i c r1 1 o d tc t he :1· is ta ]f 8 s i rt d '? a l i ng 1N-~ th i-I it le r , and 
they~ rAcall at what he almost accor.1 pllshed. \Vhat cau.ses rr,ore 
concePn is the tone, speal{ing in very general terms, of 
Am0rican Foreign Policy of the past five years. Confusion, 
vacillation, indecision are the foundation upon which it rests. 
In an atte1npt to l1urt no one, tl"1e l.Jnited States irritates its 
alli0s and antagonizes those it is trying to influence. Ask-
.. 
ing for good-will and demanding gratitude only in the far dis-
tant future, it wants 1:o be liked rather than respected. At-
'p ~· .... >" l ~ ten:pting to surmount the penalty of leadership, it is all' 
thin£s to all nations, and nothing to itself. In a situation 
dictating the purs·~it of self-interest, Aspecially the area 
of foreign aid, if t~-.e choice is bend or remRir1 rigid., it 
bends. The justification that is given is "1J11e must remain 
flexible". Idealisrr. as a foreign nolicy may be fine, but what 
happened is an errohasis on-too much human relations and too 
little "realpolitik:". Obviously the United States cannot solve 
all the world's problems. Constructing and applying an adequate 
\• 
,. 
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and effective policy in an age of world-wide economic, poli-
tical, and social rAvolution fanned by the flames of nntional-
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j 
e difficult task. It is not my aim to inv~~~Jgate in detail 
recent ArnerlGar1 :Foreign Polley. It is rny ain1, hovveve1~, to 
~,..,...-..-,.. '!t• ,..__ -- - ..... . .. -, am: .,.._ . . - -- ·- ................. 
point out 110\ve\rer superficially, an aspect of it ~lhich, if 
developing into a trend, could well lead to severe diffi-
c 
culties if carried over into a disarn~ing V'1orld. In surmnation 
then, the threat of ~vithdrawal, if not used in a most dis-
crin1inatory r1anner, would, for the proble1ns just discussed·, 
come to be just as futile and sterile a response as the doc-
trine of "'massive retaliat-iontt carne to be. 
In regard to the construction of adequate responses to 
enforce compliance, much has been written recently concerning 
directing responses toward indiv1duals rather than to that 
ponderous entity--the State. The general nrinciple seems to 
" be thnt the intRrnational enforcement agency, whenever possible, 
should act as if particular persons or property, rather than 
the state are the objects to be controlled. Arthur Waskow 
states this clearly in his paper, "Alternative I\1odels To A 
Disarmed World" v1hen he proposes that the enforcerr1ent agency; 
••• direct all enforcement to the particular 
site of the violation, rather than to the 
seat of government; the individual human 
beings actually carryirig out tt1e_ violation, 
rather than those who had ordered them to do 
............. 
L. 
so; and to precisely those acts of the· 
violating pArsons which constitute a 
viole1tion. re. ti1or t4~n ,to all of their 
1 iv ,,.. r · ·· ..,,,_ ,[-.)·r }l. ~ -" ~ . · I 0 
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lations by exerting a preponderance of force. 
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A 1 though a 
. ) 
sound idea in principle, this v1ould seerr, howevPr, to ·resenible 
gettil16 rid of weeds by cutting off the stems, and leaving ~ 
the roots. 
Lewis Sohn, in a paper entitled, "A General Survey of 
Responses to Violations", describes this method of enforce-
ment more explicitly. He makes ~~e observation that it; 
.., 
••• ?viisht be possible to have tv .. ro types of 
cases, civil and penal. States might not 
object to civil cases before an international 
tribunal in which onA of the of~icials is 
sued for having violated the dis ar~1arrient 
treaty-ooothe purpose of sucl1 a case 1.vould 
be to obtain an injunction nrol1ibiting fur-
ther· activity-, an order requi:eir1g cer~tain 
action or a decision requir·i11g rernoval of. 
a violationoo othile such an action would be 
al;:riost indistinguisr1able ... from one against 
a. ~.ta te_~ ~ t~ psychologica\l effect n1ight be 
di 1 fe re 1 .. 1.. • 
Sohn's point is, in a sense, well taken. Certainly any state 
would oppose or deny vociferously any attempt to declare it 
guilty. This is one way it could partially avoid the onerous 
burden.of responsibility. By providing a respectable avenue 
of escape, it would allovv the state to explain that the· act 
was not authorized by· it; that perhaps it was even part of a 
A 
--· 
-~-
conspiracy, carried out by some dissident and frustrated 
mill tary faction. Sucl1 a n1e tl1od 01 .. response rnay stand a 
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to its national authority. However, in thei.r montlmental work, 
World Peace Through World War, Grenville Clark and Sohn make 
a point which I cannot ~uLte accApt, feeling that it allows 
for too much governmental non-authorization and non-partici-
pation. They 1nake the point that; 
••. It is reasonable to assume that in most 
instances the governrnent of a nation in 
v-1hose territor;f a violation occurs would 
not be in·volved in it, and that. such ·viola-
tions could be adequately dealt with by 
prompt action agaip~t the individuals res-
ponsible for tr1em.' 0 
I can't help but feel that however valid this basic stand is, 
there is a tendency in this view of an attempt to ignore the 
state because it is difficult to deal with. The si11ple truth, 
, 
however, ls that the state is there and viewed as an alter-
native, existing by itself, response against individuals is 
bound to fail. Obviously, enforcement of individuals is tied 
in with world law. lt is my belief that the enforcement of 
world law upon individuals is difficult unless it is convin-
cingly related to the major objective of keeping stated under 
control, w i.thin the bounds of the disarmament agreement. 
"\ 
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Perhans an adequate analogy is the approach to espionage. Here 
each state acts against individuals but the violating state is 
-----~~----:~=r;-;.~-;+----r.r-'lnr1'TiS:"" 1' ace by a Is c Ia; ming res pons ib i 1 i ty _for. .. th1;Lv. i.o~ ..... -... - ----1 
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4. 
any great burden upon the viola tin.g nation, i_t really has .!!.Q 
I • ~ - ..... D.li$>J - -- ... -· .. ~.. .,., - .... .. ...... , ., .._._ - -~- -"lo····· 
second thouGhts about whether or not to violate in the future. 
This, I feel, is the danger of proceeding against individuals 
only in resoonse to· disarma~ent violations. OvAr a pAriod of 
time a· situation would be engendered which encouraged rather 
than discouraged the desire to evade. In reality, why shouldn't 
a nation evade, in fact make a habit of it, knowing it will not 
bear the brunt of the responsibility?· It would know also, as 
time goes by, that the costs would not outweigh the risks. Such 
a situation could present quite a dilemma. One the one hand, 
it is wise to orient responses so as -to present minimal threat 
to national governments. One important aspect of this is that 
states would perhaps be l,ess likely to demand a veto over the 
use of a small amount of force than over larger amounts of force. 
On the other hand, however, the danger that awaits is that if 
a tradition or habit of predominatingly individualized responses 
is built up, this may very well weaken the credibility of the 
deterrent against violation. 
The point is that such a problem need not.·'.·be_: l.ooked at as 
' 
- : •... 
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an either-or situation. Here is an example of such; 
••• The police must be able to act u. 1)on 
. L 
individualsooothe reason of course, is that 
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Obviously, described as such, one is apt to place grest - -···· . -· - --
stress upon responses against individuals. The implicat,ions 
. . 
of this could lead to the belief that proceeding against govern-
1. 
m.ents is impractical or even unjust. Here is another example 
of either response against individuals or else war against 
states; 
••• If there is a violation the control organ 
must have power to move to meet it; and must 
be empowered to move agains!0 individuals, not to wage war against states. -/ 
I-t is not self-evident that the problems posed by the 
power ·6f states to engage in violence or evasion can be dis-
I.. 
posed of by imposing controls upon individuals. It is my 
strong feeling that to be mos~- effective, the threatened con-
, 
-
sequences of non-compliance should be directed not only at the 
individuals who make the decision, but also at that political 
abstraction, "the state" • 
. , ..:,• 
' 
'· 
In this paper I have atte~nted to discuss and analyze 
sever~l key problems to which adequate solutions must be found 
before a stable world order may be created. We can not, just 
. . ~ . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 
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by willing it, create such an order now. However, not to 
shoulder\ sucr1 a tas1{, not to c·onfront the nrobler:1 with 
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STAGE l PREVENT IVE ACTI01~ 
·•·1. .•. .. ••••. "''' • .:.-.,,,., .. ·····. • a ........ 
PROVOCATION CONDITIONS! 
1. Enough danger seeming to exist in the judg-
ment of tl1e international authority. 
POLITICAL .t\l\TD JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION: 
1. Judgment of the Corrnnander in Chief of the Inter-
national Police Forces, apnroved by a majority 
vote of the standing Peace Committee of the 
United Nations• 
ACTIONS: 
1. Commander of International Police Forces calling 
on the parties involved to submit their argument 
to arbitration. 
2. United Nations International Police Forces moved 
into position in the threatened area. 
STAGE 2 IN'I'ERNATIO}TAL AGGRESSION 
PROVOCATION cnNDITIONS: 
1. When the contesting nations refuse to submit their 
argument to arbitration and ins·tead launch into 
military action. 
r. 
POLITICAL A1'JD J1JDIC IAL AUTHORIZATION: 
1. Decision of the Com~ander in Chief of the Inter-
11a tional Police Forces ( to be confir111ed immediate -
ly by Security Council vote) tbat a state of In-
ternational Aggression exists. 
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ACTION: 
1. Police troops should take such localized and 
limited mllitary action as needed to defend them-
selveso 
-···---·- -~-....--,--· _ __,_, ___ .---.. -. -·· ..... 
. ·-·--- --·----. ---
._..I• I• ••f. \ • t•1 i ,• ,· '; • O ' '"' 
---=- .. ,.., ..... ,. '. .' : '· ,. 
" STAGE 3 
2 ~ SAcurity Council to give the military Commander 
limited temporary authority; his actions to be re-
,,1 e i:i! '?d; c-o::. f-i r-~---:ed, --~e--2.~~r~t ..... u ·1.""i!arrJ sd ·; · g_r·_ ext e11d e d • ··· - . 
-3. The Eggression su·bmitted for reviev:r of the Security 
c·o'llli~ ll vf ti1e uni-r-ed ~1'fti:ons, ""'w11os 8~--~~ jority·· '"vOt·e 
could instantly countermand the orders of the Com-
mander in Chief and instruct·him to desist from 
military action 3nd withdraw, or confirm his judg-
ment and order him to continue limited defense ac-
tion. 
INTERNfiTI01!AL ID.IBRGENCY 
PROVOCATION CONDITIONS: 
1. The aggressor nati9n persists in its attacks against 
the victim and against the defending International 
Police Forces and refuses to accept a cease-fire 
agreemAnt and to submit its grievance to arbitration. 
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION: 
1. Security Council by majority vote, in a new veto-
proof form, must jeclare that an International 
Emergency exists. 
2. Immediate consideration of the case by theVvorld 
Court fro~ the standpoint of justice, equity, and 
international lavv (but ~,ithout requiring ternporary 
effective action to vvait on the decision) o This 
decision to be presented to the United Nations and 
made nublic as soon as available and thus to serve 
as a check on possible incorrect temporary action. 
' I 
ACTIO}TS: 
1. Comnander in Chief should be authorized to put all 
his forces into an all-out attack against the ag-
gressor ~n his home area as well as in the country 
being attacl{ed. 
. . 
/ 
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2. If forces available are insufficient to quell the 
aggressioi1, the m.ajorit:f ·vo.te of the Security Council 
with maj-0::,ity vote of the GenAral Asserably could 
au tl-1oriz ::~ ca11--; ng up 1 nto full rni li tary o.c tion any 
part or all of thA Internation9l Reserve Forces, 
subject to the sub~ e-qu-e-n-t- -re-11--ie-t,v- -ar.id· --opini O!l" ··of·· tr1e · · · · · -· · · · · · · · · · · 
----------------------'~rr-~nur-1· lu CuU.r' t. .. ···-··--- ··-· 
---------· -------s ii A a E -4 --------. --- - ----~vo R tn -c· R is rs ------------... -- -. ... - - .... - .. .. -- -· -. .. ........ 
.. 
--
-- -.._ .. -- :··~ 
PROVOCATION C0NDI1ION: 
,.._.._ .. ...,. ____ -·.- ,. •. ......... """"" _ ... ,., ... 
1. It is ap0arent that the conflagration threatens to 
grow into a full-scale world war and tliat all mili-
tary forces would be needAd to stop it. 
POLITICAL AND JGDICIAL AUTHORIZATIO}J: 
1. Two-thirds vote of the Security Council and two-
thirds vote of the General Assembly (minus votes of 
contestant nations) together with the approval of 
tl1e '/} orld Court. 
ACTI011: 
1. National Forces _to be voluntarily committed to the 
fi 0 l1t ing alongside the International Policy Forces 
and International Reserves. 
2.· Use all and every kind of force, including Prohib-
ited Weapons, until the aggfessor is defeated and 
the aggression is corrected • 
.... 
. ., ., -
-..-·-· 
_,, 
103 
THE BARUCH FLAN: STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRES'RNTATIVE 
. (BARUCH) TO THE UlJIT~D NATIONS ATOMIC ENF.RGY COlvIMISSJON, JUNE 14, 1946. 
. . . . .. . - . _.. · .. ·:-· •: ..... -~ '. . - . . . . . . . . . - . . .. . - . - - - ... - . - . - . - . - . - . - - - . - . . ... - - - - - - . . . . -
--· · -· · · · · · · (Maj or -F;xce~·r~-P~--t~· s~· ~o~· 111:-lh--~YL. )L. ·_-__________ _ 
~----,..-,----------=----- ·-···- ---------··--- -·--- -- ----· ----------- ----------· -------·---------------------· -
··--·------·-··-··----·--·-······-·····-·-· --- -·-----·· --------------------~--------------
;:. - . - . -. -- -- -- --~ . -. -· ~ --,. -. -. -. - ------ - . - -- -- - - ------- ----
·- .. _______ -,. ... 
- ------------- . 
• --------------• I 
- · · ·· - - - - ... ~ - - - • - - ·: ·.·:-~~Through the h:i. s tor ica 1 approach I. ha.ve. outl in0d, We -f lnd-: .. __ __ _ 
-~-"-4- ...:. - ·-· ... ·o·u l'~ se i' n·A·s .. 'r1·e TlA t:o f.p n ~ i·f·· ~r:i 'n C-'='- Y\ ... ~~~--,-~···~r~e . J.L, .. ~r·1·r:u¥·u·,r'1·- ·n··· r·s··· ;i-;1··-1· 1··· -a-n·a-· ---- -- . -. -· -.. . • , .. _ . - -----. /.L.V-:-' -':- .• I ~ !..i'\ ··' ..:.---1 .:.:.:.....:... .......:.. ... :--..1..i. \.../'.J.U"" , [~ vv 
· · ·' · · · · · faith, the miracle of peace, just as he has, through s-c._i~_!1<?.e .. ·-·---~-- . 
and ]r j 1 l th A i -nri ~J....e /"\ .C" +-~~ ~ ·, ..L ·-- --- _, ... -. .. · · · ··· ~·' ····-
--,- ~-- .•• ~ •.. ' .;_.A'•< U ,,:,- •' • -' !!! ~ .:,_ _;, ~ - -s---· '-'"':.':. -·- .L ... -~ ~~ J.l. ·-··--· - ... 
The United States p~roses the creation of an International 
AtoMic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all 
phases of the devlopment and use of atomic energy, Starting with 
the raw material and including--
1. Manqgerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy 
activities potentially dangerous to world security, 
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic 
activities. 
f 3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic 
energy. 
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirma-
tive character intended to put the Authority in the forefront 
of atomic lcnowledtse and thus to enable it to comprehend, and -
therefor to detect 9 misuse of atomic energy. To be e ffec ti ve, 
the Authority must itself be the w~ld 1 s leader in the field of 
atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal 
authority with the great pol'1er inhf:lrent in possession of leader-
ship in knowledge. 
I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion. 
But I think the peoples we serve would· not believe--am 
without faith nothing counts--that a treaty, merely outlawing 
possession or use of the atomic bomb, constitutes effective ful-
filment of the instructions to this Commission. Previous fail-
ures have '1een recorded in trying the method of simple renuncia-
tion, unsupported by effective guaranties of security and arma-
ment limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone, 
Now, if ever, is the ti 'le to act for the common good, 
Public opinion supports a world movem'ent toward securl ty. If 
I read the signs aribht, the peoples want a program not composed 
I, '• 
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merely of pious thoubhts but of enforceable sanctions--an inter-national law with teeth in it. 
We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the vrorld and real~- .in>-~ 
~-, ~~-..;H.: ~,:~8R us arising , 
.......... __ .... ,- ... __ .... __ f ~0.TD .. . OJ))~ .. !)0_:~-S-A S S.i-0~- - G f -~-tl1-n. --~118 ~cDiJ- ··u f- --pr .. ar}~~~i~fll{~ --t~l~1~·: _\r9°[r1_Q· ~ ~ii_C} ~-J:t_: Qftf .. ·-~-~---~-~-~-~ ~ -: i .............. ~ ..................... t.ao .. ·:t&·'5t; · ·t; r11r t; · .. 1: t · · i1r · 1_Jrfrt" · cYri. -cfu r· ~ a rmEtrr1n nt, are pre pa rd to make ,. 
I 
our full contr1.but ion tc~v.i::.:r1d effecti"T:e cc~trol of' & tor11ic er1~rgy. ~ 
\Vl1en a~n ad ec1ua te sys t e::1 f-o r con tro 1 of a__i.9~ic .. ~n~.r.~Y-1---.J_n":'~·---· .. _. _. _. clud l ng th9 rer1li11cia't"fon oi~Iie' 'b'omb a's a \Veapon, has been agreed upon a11d put into effective operat=i_,Jn and condign punisl1.ments set un f'or violations of the rules of control vvhich are to be • . L stigmn.tized as international crimes, vlfe propose that--
1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; 
2. ~xisting bombs shall b8 disposed of pursuant to the te~s of the treaty; and 
3. The Authority shall in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy. 
--------
••••• As matters now stand several·years may be necessary for another country to produce a bomb, de novo. However, once the basic information is generally known, and the Authority has est-ablished producing plants for peaceful purvoses in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolAnt nation to pro~uce a bomb in 12 months, and if pre-ceded by secret prenaration Bnd necessary facllities perhaps ever1 in a rnucl1. sl1orter tirne. The ti'.ne required-c:,the advance warni.!'1g g:liven of the possible use of a bomb- .... cai1 011ly be gen-erally ··estln1qted but obviously \ll'ill dene11d upo11. rnany factors, , including the success with which the Authority has heen able to introdu.ce elen1ents of safet~> in the design of its plants and the .. degree to wh 1 ch illegal and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will have been eliminatedo Pre-sumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one bo~b. 
This shows how imperative speed is in ·detecting and nenal-izing violations. 
Tl1e process of prevention and penaliza tion--a, problem of profound statecraft--is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow 
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statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
_the United St8 tes, and the Uni tea I{ingdori a fe\\' montl1s ago. 
- ----- -;....,--,-
.... ____________ _ 
. -· ...... -........... - .;_ .. ·..................................................................... ·•. . . . .. . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .......... . 
................. 
••••• I no~v subrr.it the follow:ng me9.sures_ '1S representing·the funda:~1Gntal fe8.tur·es of a "9lan vvl1Ich v,oull1 give ·effect to cer-tain of the C(jnclus_:_011s vvl1.1cl1 I have epitor.'1ized. 
1. G8n0ral. The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of ntomic energy, through various forms of ovrnersb,ip, don'!ini8n, licenses, o:pera t~ en, ir1SJJecti on, research, · · and rn 0.11 ~1 g fnn fj n t by c o · · p e tent per s o 1111 e 1 o J~ f t e r t 11 -i s i s pro ,.ride d for, t11e1..,e sl1ould be as little it1terfere11ce as :nay be vii th tl1e econornic !""'la11s wd tr1e present '.'rivate, corporate, and state re-lationships in the several countries involved. 
12. Pro6 ress by Stages. A primary step·in the creation of the system of control is thA setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibilities, powers, and limita-tions of t lie t .. u thori ty o Once a criar ter f'or thA Autl1ority has been adopted, the Authority and th~ system of control for which it will be resnonsiblA will require ti~e to become fully or~ ganiz8d ~nd effectiveo The plan of control will, ther8fore, have to co'-,1e lr1to effect ir1 successive stages. These sl1ould be specifically fixed in the chart2r or ~Aans should be otherwise set fortl1 in the charter for tra?.1sitions fron1 one stage to ariotra r, 1 as conte:nplated i11 tte resolution of the United l~ations Assembly 11hic 11 ere 8 te d tlli s C onrrn is s ion. 
---------
••••• And- .. nov, I· end. I have subml tted an outline for present· discussion. Gur consideration will be broad~ned by the criti-cisrr1 of tl1e united States pro~osnls 8.nd b~:l tl1e plans of the th t · , · , .. t · t ~ · ., · 11 , , · ~ J a t o er ns. ions, i."rr1-;_Cr1 9 i is o OA ricpAa~ t.::i oe suon1iuce· a tl1Air An.rly~ co~1_-\.r e11lence o I s.11d JY(Y associP. te8 of the U11lted S tG. te s j)e 1,, ;at i or1 v1 i 11 :t~.r:i1=~ a ·va i ln b 1 13 to r=! a c 11 rnernbe r D f t~1i s bod~i bool<:s a:1d pa;r:-rrllr?ts, =-ncludi,..1g tl1c A.cl10sor1=-L.j_lle11tr1al re-v . port, reccntl-..J n1ade by the United St2tes ":Jep~rtr,1e:1t of State, 8 ~d thP i'i·~civ; a.11011 C on:1-1 it tee I1~ onot:ca pl1 11 o o 1 e~n titled "~ s :-3 er1 tia 1 Inforrnn. tior1 011 )l. to-r0ic S11e1.,g~~t" relating to tl1e ~vlcI/lahon bill re,, .. cently pa-~sed b~/ tl1e United 3tatos Sente, v1hicl1 rr1ay p~ove ofl value in assess~r1o thA situation. // 
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All of u~ are cnnsAcr~ted to making ~n end of gloom and 
l10D8l83Sl1ASS. It '.:rill ~ot be c.~ ee.s~r job. '11}1A l!/8.:/ l..S l.c1ng 
9.nd th.crny9 b11t ,Jll.prerr:el-y 1.·.rortr1 tJ_•;J\~ 1~li11g. All of us \V~!.nt to· 
-- . i -~-·• 
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out by all for all. 
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Article l. 
DisarmG.ri er1 t Ubl iga t ions 
••••• 2. To hn'\·e, at t11eir J_i~;csal, upon conpletion of genoral Rnd co~~nlete disar:··18.tr·c~nt., cr1l·I s t-:rictl -.. - lir~1 ted co11tir1~-:ent8 of - ., ., " G ;!> police (~ilit~a) e~uipped with lifht firna~c2, ~na intended 
n 
-'-' ~ ~ n • t 1 "1 d ...., t· d • l 1 or ~~-1~ ":';S1..n _.0r2!1cs 01 111 .,ern8 __ oroer ~1.11 1or r10 isc ia1·ge 
0 ° .;- L. ·1° -~ l• r· l · l J..~ ,_ .. 0 1- l •. --. ~ S '." .• -~ t 1.,l. r 8 ,: . f'"", rd -'-Lr- t 'r· lr-.. i-11 rJ l_. i-, t- 0 D 0 n C e ,-. [ l0 11 ·l- Ar -.1. V ,.· ~ - V I • - t.i C,I, u . ....,, J 1 ' ,! ..L L , 0 '-" V ,_, • I - '..A .:. ~ -~ ._, u . . V 
- u _, 
natinral p8ri.ce and security, under) the United Natio11s Cl1arter 
a11d llnder tl1e ~rovislor!S of Article '2,7 of tl1e pre~~eI'lt Treaty. 
4. To carry out all rre3sures of general and complete disarman"'.ent in st:ch a '-nay thnt at no stagP o~ disr)_rrnnn1ent 
could any State or group cf Ststes gain ~ilitnry ajvantage 2-nd tr1'.":t securit·y 1nould be e11slire.d equally for all States p31,ties to tr1e Troat:/• 
---------
Article 2. 
Control Gbligations 
••••• 1. The States p~rties to the Tr0aty sole~nly undertake-to carr~,r out all disarrVJainent n~:eo.sures, fror:-i beginning to end, 
under· ~1trict international cc~trol, a11d to e11sure tr1e imple-
mentatlon i~ their territories of all control measur8s set fortr1 i11 Parts .1I, .1II and IV of tl1e p1,esent Treat¥,. 
3. To ir.1nlement control over disarnar-·tent, an International Disar~R~ent Crganlzation includln~ all St8tes p9rtios to the Treaty shall be establ1_sl-1ed 1;vi·thin tr1e frame 1Norl~. of' the U11ited Nations. It sr1all begin opeI'ating as soon as disarn1arnent 
rr,ensures are initinted. 1rhe structure and fur1cticns of the 
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.I11terna tional Disarriament Cr•ganiza. tion and l ts bodiea are laid 
'aown in Part V of the present Treaty. 
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Article 3. 
----- ........ ------····'· ••11,,,, ...•..•.•. 
___ .......... ._ .•.... ....... _____ ~ --~ ...... . 
-- . 
ObliLations to L'~aintal11 Inter119.tional Peace and Sectlrity 
••••• 1. The States psrties to the Treaty solemnly confirm 
their rGsol,,;e i~: tl1e cwrse of and after general and complete 
dis s. r~.r:an1e n t : 
(a) to base relations vvltl1 eacr1 other on the prl11-
cinles of peaceful and friendl·y ·co-existence and cooperation; 
(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to 
settle a11~ inter11ational disputes that n1ay arise, but to use 
to those ends the nrocedure3 provided for in the united rJations 
Charter; 
( C) to s trer10 tl1en tb.e u11~ ted Na ticns as the nrin-
cipal institution for the Maintenance of pe~ce and for the 
settlemer1t of i11ternational disputes by pP.aceful mea11s. 
2. The Sts tes pnrties to the ·rrea ty undertal::e to r8 frain 
from using t·lie contir1ger1ts of police (r:iilitia), rer:1aining at 
their dis 1Josal upon c ornple-tion of L~eneral a11d cornple te disarn~a -
ment,, in any r1:arn1er otl-1e:1 tl1an for ti10 sa -cesu.ardint; of tt1e 
int91·(1s.l securit:y- nf State:: 01" for1 tb.e dischsrge of tr1ci11 ob-
ligatio~s to maintain internstional peace and se_curity, under 
the United riations Charter. 
- - - ·- .... .-·· ... ·. - -
Cliapter X 
.lw~easures to Safegur1rd the Security or·states to 
Maintain International Pe~ce. 
Article 36. 
Continc:jents of Police (ltiilitia) 
,~~.-
••••• To maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of 
-----p 
.• ·r 
- . 
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the frontiers and of the personal security of citizens, and to 
ensu.r0 co,~::::!_lnnc0 w1 th thr-,-'r obllgnt:lons in reg,a:0 rl t-_o .tflo 1~:[1i~-
+-0·,:,1·,·· r, ··, _,., -. i· 111-,~.-,.,,1r1 l·-1..· r,•,,-,cil t,n,, (•-(', :r.~-~1 (l Clr>LJ-n-j 4---, l?Yl(~O,..., ~l..,:-. U,1 ·~ tr:d 
..l~;..Lr..1..:.\...,,• \..)J. '-',- ..... .i. ,_,_,_, '--.l.l.C,.,1, .c·J .\..I.' .A.,U 1...\~_.•\, ·.J..-- Gj --.1 -...,·v.;. ·~I.I,., .l...,..L · 
'T 
1 
• ,· • ' ' l 1 -, J • 1 • J. t • · -
\\:· ,"', ;. .. ·1. ( ·. ·., •'. • l., ,.-·, ,--; "',:• ·t- ,r-. ·n . ·, j' c_'":, l -,- OJ ·- ('· , ... , Y, ,- .,.._ ·1- ., - - - .. . , ' ' -. • ,r-_•, r1· .""'_; __ !_, -'- :.../·•, {"'_ .. _  · P, l~J -
-
_________ _:J.~'t~C..~ll,~_L~~~-· -~- _:U~~L :__··· 7,:~ ~l'.~' 1:~., .::;_-· -::""~~~! ::::':....!'~· ~-=-· :' ~-~ '.  ::~· . -~ ..._ · 1..J • ' '·--' I, L l. ,. '. . !. • !- . , ·• : __ . 17·' - - • 
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• l, , ; - ' ,, ': l' J, ~ C ' - c, '. 'J <_; V '_, -· V J - ' - J ' ' ' ' ' - •'• - ', -· ~ ~ , 
s t1
1 
ic Cl,1 l _;_,-,,_;_ t,:;._:i co :J tinge n ts of pol ice (mill tia) , e q u ipne d w· 1th 
Th"' '-,,-,n;:th of these contingents of police (n,ilitia) fo1• 
Asen State partJ· to the Treaty shall be, as follqws: 
2. The 3t&tes V'rtie3 to thA Treaty shall Ge allowed to 
rr:anufac ~u1·e ::;tric tl.\; 1irnl ted qc:w.11ti t' -:?3 of lie;ht fi:reArr
1
s in-
tended for such contint/'nts of police ( '1ili tia). ThP list of 
plo.nts produclnc s1;ch nr:~s, tlwir q1;otas 2.nd types for each 
p8.rty to the Treaty shall b0 specified in a s;:ecial agreerr,ent. 
- ·- - - - - -
Police (Militia) Units to be Made Available 
to the Security Council 
'· 
••••• 1. The States pr;rties to the Treaty undertake to place 
at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units 
fro:n the number of contingents of policy {militia) retair:ed 
b,'- the::, as wel_l a::i to rrovide assistance and facilities, in-
cludfrg rights 'of pas2age-. The placing of' such units at the 
disposal of tlrn Security CounCil shall be carried out under 
the nrovisio;1s 01~ Art:Lcle 43 of the UnltsC: Nations Chl'lrter• •. 
To Pnsm~ 0 that urgent n:ilitary rr:ee.surPs may be undertaken, 
the States partieJ to the l'reaty shall ma1ntain ina state of 
in,;r:8.Jia te rAadiness that part cf the poJ.icy (militia) contin-
gents vvblci:1 is intended for joint international "-nforcement ac-
tion. The c,ize of the units· which the States parties to the 
l'rcaty o.ndertal-rn to place at the disposal of thP Secur•ity 
Council, as well as th0 8 reas whero they are s tr, tioned, shall 
Ce snecified in agreer,ents to be conc).uded by the States parties 
to the Treaty with the Security Councilo 
2. The comr.-iand of th0 uni ts N!i'e rred to in Paragraph 1 
shall be made up of representa tl ves or tho three principal 
·tC:roups of States existing in the 1J1orld on the bas is of equal 
representation. 'I'he corrnnanding body shall decide on all ques-
t ions by agreemec t among_ its members re presenting the three groups of States 
·, 
' ... '... ···: •,; 
·:./ 
-.· 
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